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INTRODUCTION 
It is a commonplace, at least for those of us who like to spend lots 
of time thinking about federal jurisdiction, that the conferral of juris-
diction on the federal courts over cases involving questions of federal 
law is designed principally to serve two goals.  First, the establishment 
of such jurisdiction secures a hospitable forum for parties advancing 
claims that are grounded in federal law.  State courts, it is argued, are 
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apt to exhibit bias against federal claims; the establishment of federal 
jurisdiction permits parties who are concerned about such bias to 
avoid litigating in the state courts.  Second, the jurisdictional grant is 
thought to yield greater uniformity in the interpretation of federal law 
because federal judges have more expertise in the interpretation of 
such law and are less numerous than their counterparts at the state 
level. 
As one might expect, entire bodies of Supreme Court doctrine in-
volving the scope of federal jurisdiction explicitly take heed of con-
cerns relating to state court bias and, indeed, are largely driven by 
judges’ attitudes with respect to this issue.  For example, cases relating 
to the proper scope of federal habeas review, and whether federal 
courts should abstain from deciding questions of federal law (so that 
state court proceedings can run their course), focus intently on the 
issue of state-court bias against federally protected rights.1
Case law at the intersection of federal jurisdiction and the uni-
formity concern, however, is markedly different in character.  One 
must strain to identify cases in which the Court carefully tinkers with 
the rules of federal jurisdiction so as to calibrate them in a manner 
that will best serve the interest in securing a uniform interpretation of 
federal law.  While Supreme Court opinions occasionally mention this 
interest, the Justices typically fail to offer it sustained attention. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in connection with the doc-
trine of complete preemption.  Through this doctrine, the Court has 
singled out a set of preemptive federal statutes for special jurisdic-
tional treatment.  Specifically, notwithstanding the venerable well-
pleaded complaint rule, which permits litigants to invoke federal 
question jurisdiction only when the plaintiff’s cause of action is 
grounded in federal law, the complete preemption cases allow the 
1 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976) (taking note of the argu-
ment that “state courts cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values 
through fair application of the rule,” and concluding that “we are unwilling to assume 
that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in 
the trial and appellate courts of the several States”); id. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(premising his argument, in part, on “the concern that state judges may be unsympa-
thetic to federally created rights” (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 225 
(1969))); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (noting that the Congress that 
enacted the predecessor to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “was concerned that state instrumentali-
ties could not protect [federally created] rights; it realized that state officers might, in 
fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those rights; and it believed that these failings 
extended to the state courts”). 
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federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over causes of action that are 
pleaded in state law terms. 
One can imagine a jurisdictional doctrine that treats preemption 
cases specially on the ground that the interest in uniformity features 
prominently when such statutes are at issue.  When Congress pre-
empts state law, one effect of its doing so is to homogenize the rule 
with which regulated entities are expected to comply.  And we might 
want to make it particularly easy for cases calling for the interpretation 
of such statutes to get into the federal system, where they will be de-
cided by courts that are thought most likely to interpret the law uni-
formly, thereby helping to secure the homogeneity Congress means to 
provide.2
But the Court has declined to connect the doctrine of complete 
preemption to the basic policies relevant to the existence and scope of 
federal question jurisdiction, including the interest in a uniform in-
terpretation of federal law.  Indeed, the complete preemption cases 
offer nothing in the way of systematic thinking about the uniformity 
interest and how it relates to federal jurisdiction.  Complete preemp-
tion doctrine thus presents a puzzle:  how and why has the Court 
come to afford the covered cases special jurisdictional treatment, and 
why is a doctrine that appears to call for justification by reference to 
foundational jurisdictional policies—the uniformity interest in par-
ticular—seemingly disconnected from them?  This Article offers a 
close analysis of this unusual rule of federal jurisdiction in an effort to 
answer these questions.  It makes the case that, due to its neglect of 
the core values underlying the vesting of federal question jurisdiction 
in the federal courts, the Court has established a doctrine that is un-
stable and unsound.  This Article argues, further, that the doctrine 
might be satisfyingly remodeled by shaping it around the interest in a 
uniform interpretation of federal law. 
Part I introduces the central themes in the law of federal question 
jurisdiction.  It describes the prevailing interpretations of the constitu-
tional and statutory texts governing the federal courts’ jurisdiction to 
adjudicate disputes involving questions of federal law, and it explores 
2 There is cause to wonder, given the proliferation of federal judges and federal 
courts, as well as the proliferation and complexity of modern federal law, whether the 
lower federal courts truly offer a meaningful advantage over state courts when it comes 
to uniformity of interpretation.  But I leave such wondering to another day.  For pur-
poses of this Article, I take this vital piece of the conventional wisdom relating to fed-
eral courts as a given.  Indeed, I rely heavily on this facet of the conventional wisdom 
in shaping a new approach to complete preemption in Part III, infra. 
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the reasons for the establishment of such jurisdiction.  This Part also 
introduces the well-pleaded complaint rule and examines the reasons 
for its adoption by the Supreme Court. 
Part II provides a detailed account of complete preemption doc-
trine, under which parties are permitted to usher state-law claims into 
the federal courts despite the apparent absence of any federal ques-
tion on the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.  Under the 
complete preemption rule, a state-law claim will fall within the federal 
question jurisdiction of the federal courts if it is preempted by a fed-
eral statutory scheme that provides the exclusive cause of action for 
the harm alleged.  Part II emphasizes the apparent disconnect be-
tween this special jurisdictional rule and the reasons underlying the 
creation of federal question jurisdiction in the first place—-in particu-
lar, the need for uniformity in the interpretation of federal law. 
Part III answers the question of what complete preemption juris-
prudence might look like were it reshaped in light of the relationship 
between preemption and the uniformity interest.  I develop this an-
swer by focusing on a feature of this interest that has been overlooked 
by courts and commentators alike.  Specifically, the interest in uni-
formity comes in two distinct forms:  “equal-application uniformity,” 
which denotes the interest in assuring that all parties subject to a par-
ticular regulatory rule are treated alike, and “regulatory uniformity,” 
which refers to the interest in subjecting regulated entities to a single 
rule of law when regulation by a multitude of sovereigns would be in-
tolerable.  I argue that the intensity of the interest in regulatory uni-
formity varies significantly among federal statutory schemes and that 
where this interest is implicated with unusual force, the argument for 
federal jurisdiction is strongest.  I explain, finally, that we can discern 
when the interest in regulatory uniformity is in play through careful 
attention to how broadly preemptive a federal statutory scheme is.  
Accordingly, Part III makes the case that the doctrine of complete 
preemption would operate more sensibly if it were remodeled with an 
eye to the breadth of federal preemption. 
I.  FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION 
A.  The Basics 
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to 
confer jurisdiction on the federal courts over “all Cases . . . arising un-
der this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
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made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.”3  The canoni-
cal interpretation of this Clause is provided by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, which holds that a suit 
“arises under” federal law so long as a question of federal law “forms 
an ingredient of the original cause.”4  Under this construction, Con-
gress may channel cases into the federal courts in which no federal 
question is actually raised by either party; all that is required is that a 
federal question lurk in the background of the litigation.5
The federal statute governing the scope of federal question juris-
diction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, largely mirrors the constitutional text.  It 
provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States.”6  Notwithstanding the textual similarity, statutory “aris-
ing under” jurisdiction is considerably narrower than its constitutional 
counterpart.  In a series of cases decided in the decades immediately 
following the passage of the Judiciary Act of 18757 (which conferred 
general federal question jurisdiction on the federal courts for the first 
time8), the Court took the position that jurisdiction under the federal 
question statute exists only when a federal question is presented on 
the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.  That is, jurisdiction 
will exist under § 1331 only if a claim grounded in federal law is pre-
3 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  Note that this provision does not require Congress to 
confer such jurisdiction on the federal courts.  Indeed, save the brief period in be-
tween the passage and repeal of the so-called “Midnight Judges Act,” Act of Feb. 13, 
1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92, repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 
132, Congress did not confer general federal question jurisdiction on the lower federal 
courts until 1875, Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470.  But see David E. 
Engdahl, Federal Question Jurisdiction Under the 1789 Judiciary Act, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. 
REV. 521, 521-22 (1989) (arguing that the Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred jurisdiction 
on the federal courts over more or less “all cases” then arising under federal law). 
4 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824). 
5 For example, federal jurisdiction was determined to exist in Osborn because the 
case involved a suit brought by a federally chartered bank, and the questions of 
whether the bank could sue or be sued and, if so, whether it could do so in federal 
courts—both questions of federal law—were deemed to “form an original ingredient 
in every cause” involving such a bank.  Id. at 824.  These federal questions, the Court 
held, “[w]hether [they] be in fact relied on or not, [are] still a part of the cause.”  Id. 
6 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). 
7 Ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. 
8 Id. § 1.  But see Engdahl, supra note 3, at 521-22 (arguing that the Judiciary Act of 
1789 conferred something akin to general federal question jurisdiction on the federal 
courts). 
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sent in the complaint,9 and is asserted by the plaintiff 10 as part of her 
affirmative theory of relief.11
B.  The Reasoning Behind the Jurisdictional Scheme 
1.  Why Federal Question Jurisdiction? 
The vesting of federal question jurisdiction in the federal courts 
has long been understood to serve two principal goals:  it helps pre-
vent state court hostility to claims grounded in federal law from un-
dermining the purposes these laws are intended to serve, and it helps 
to secure uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal 
law.12  Concern relating to state judicial bias in the application of fed-
9 See Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586, 589 (1888) (“[I]t must appear, at the 
outset, from the declaration or the bill of the party suing, that the suit is of [a federal] 
character . . . .”).  Note that this passage need not be read as prohibiting the exercise 
of federal jurisdiction on the basis of a federal defense.  It suggests only that the fed-
eral character of the suit must be evident from the declaration of the party suing; and 
this might be accomplished through the plaintiff’s anticipation of a federal defense.  
See James H. Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. 
PA. L. REV. 639, 661-62 (1942); Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason for It; It’s Just 
Our Policy:  Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question 
Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 613-14 (1987).  This possibility was foreclosed, how-
ever, by the Supreme Court’s decision in Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 
454 (1894).  See infra note 10. 
10 See Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. at 461 (holding that even if the plaintiff’s 
complaint anticipates the presentation of a federal defense, and the defendant, in fact, 
presents this very defense, federal jurisdiction will not lie).  In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court relied on a passage from Osborn which states:  “[T]he right of the plain-
tiff to sue cannot depend on the defence which the defendant may choose to set up.  
His right to sue is anterior to that defence, and must depend on the state of things 
when the action is brought.”  Id. at 459 (quoting Osborn, 22 U.S. at 824).  As has been 
noted by numerous scholars, this passage from Osborn was wrenched out of context by 
the Court in Union & Planters’ Bank and deployed to support a proposition diametri-
cally opposite the one it was designed to establish.  See, e.g., Doernberg, supra note 9, at 
615-16. 
11 Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (“It is not 
enough that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action and 
asserts that the defense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitution of the 
United States.”). 
12 The federal courts’ capacity to provide greater uniformity in the interpretation 
of federal law is typically grounded in the fact that (1) there are considerably fewer 
federal judges than state judges, and (2) federal judges are presumed to have greater 
expertise in the interpretation of federal law.  See, e.g., ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF 
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, 164-65 (1968) [hereinafter ALI 
STUDY]. 
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eral law is as old as the Union itself.  Thus, in Federalist 81, Alexander 
Hamilton insisted that 
the most discerning cannot foresee how far the prevalency of a local 
spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for the jurisdiction of 
national causes . . . . State judges, holding their offices during pleasure, 
or from year to year, will be too little independent to be relied upon for 
an inflexible execution of the national laws.
13
Numerous landmark decisions of the Supreme Court relating to the 
scope of federal jurisdiction advance claims similar to those raised in 
Federalist 81.14  The capacity of the lower federal courts to produce 
greater uniformity in the interpretation of federal law likewise lies at the 
heart of the conventional wisdom relating to why the federal courts 
ought to be given jurisdiction over cases involving federal law.15  It is 
hardly surprising, then, that the piecemeal expansion of federal juris-
diction during the mid-nineteenth century,16 as well as the conferral of 
general federal question jurisdiction on the federal courts by way of the 
Act of 1875, were driven largely by Congress’s desire to secure an im-
partial forum for the protection of rights conferred under federal law17 
13 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 486 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961).  Hamilton was not alone among prominent members of the founding genera-
tion in advancing this reason for vesting jurisdiction over questions of federal law in 
the federal courts.  During the Constitutional Convention, for example, James Madi-
son argued in favor of creating “inferior [federal] tribunals . . . throughout the Repub-
lic” in order to assuage concerns related to “improper Verdicts in State tribunals ob-
tained under the biassed [sic] directions of a dependent Judge, or the local prejudices 
of an undirected jury . . . .”  1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
124 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
14 See, e.g., Osborn v. United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 821 (1824); Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 416 (1821); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 
Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816). 
15 See, e.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 12, at 165-67 (discussing the federal courts’ ca-
pacity to provide a uniform interpretation of federal law). 
16 See, e.g., Act of March 2, 1833, § 3, 4 Stat. 632, 633 (providing for the removal to 
federal court of suits against officers of the United States relating to enforcement of 
federal revenue laws); Act of March 3, 1863, § 5, 12 Stat. 755, 756-57 (authorizing re-
moval of suits in which defendants asserted claims of federal immunity); Act of Feb. 28, 
1871, § 16, 16 Stat. 433, 438-39 (allowing removal of suits relating to race discrimina-
tion in voting). 
17 See Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State 
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 508 (1928) (characterizing jurisdictional legislation en-
acted during the first half of the nineteenth century as “directed towards demon-
strated inadequacy of state agencies”); see also G. Merle Bergman, Reappraisal of Federal 
Question Jurisdiction, 46 MICH L. REV. 17, 28 (1947) (“There seems little doubt 
that . . . fear of local prejudice motivated the proponents of the change in 1875.  The 
late war had fanned the flames of sectional distrust so that considerations of this na-
ture were greater than at any other time in the nation’s history.  It is not surprising, 
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and to provide for greater uniformity in the interpretation and applica-
tion of federal law.18
These themes—combating state court bias and securing uniform-
ity—have not lost their resonance with the passage of time.19  To the 
contrary, twentieth-century commentary on the purposes served by 
the establishment of federal question jurisdiction is much the same.20
2.  Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule? 
The Court’s expansive construction (in Osborn) of the jurisdiction-
conferring language from Article III seems well adapted to serve the 
general goals described above.  By authorizing Congress to confer ju-
risdiction upon the federal courts so long as a federal question might 
conceivably arise during litigation, the Court gave the legislature ex-
traordinary latitude to deploy the federal courts in order to safeguard 
the interests underlying the constitutional grant of power.21  As nu-
therefore, that legislation was introduced to meet the threat of local bias.”); id. at 30 
(“[T]he change, which the act of 1875 introduced, was brought about largely, if not 
entirely, in order to provide an impartial forum for those cases in which the federal 
question might be prejudiced in state courts.”). 
18 See Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 
1990 BYU L. REV. 67, 83-84 (“The primary reason for adding this jurisdiction in 1875 is 
said to have been the desire for uniformity in the interpretation and application of 
federal law.” (citing Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 826 (1986) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting))). 
19 Doernberg, supra note 9, at 648 (“In the years since The Federalist, there has 
been virtually no disagreement with Hamilton’s initial assessment.”). 
20 For commentary emphasizing these dual purposes of federal “arising under” 
jurisdiction, see ALI STUDY, supra note 12, at 164-68; id. app. c at 483; Chadbourn & 
Levin, supra note 9, at 641, 643-45; William Cohen, The Broken Compass:  The Requirement 
That a Case Arise “Directly” Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 892-93, 910 (1967); 
Ray Forrester, The Nature of a “Federal Question”, 16 TUL. L. REV. 362, 362 n.1 (1942); 
Alan D. Hornstein, Federalism Judicial Power and the “Arising Under” Jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Courts:  A Hierarchical Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 563, 564-65 (1981); Paul J. Mishkin, The 
Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 158-59 & n.10, 171-72, 
184-85 (1953). 
21 See, e.g., Ernest J. London, “Federal Question” Jurisdiction—A Snare and a Delusion, 
57 MICH. L. REV. 835, 838 n.13 (1959) (noting that Osborn’s reading of Article III, § 2 
was “sufficiently plastic . . . to fit almost any future contingency”).  Osborn’s expansive 
interpretation of Article III is consistent with the Marshall Court’s general program of 
cementing (and broadening) the power of the federal government.  The decision ul-
timately punts the question of just how broad federal question jurisdiction would be to 
Congress, but ensures that Congress has as much latitude as it could possibly want to 
meet the needs of the federal government as they changed over time.  See Chadbourn 
& Levin, supra note 9, at 649 (“[I]n the Osborn case Marshall was construing for the fu-
ture, and characteristically he construed broadly in order to allow future change and 
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merous scholars have argued, however, the well-pleaded complaint 
rule is hardly conducive to advancing the core purposes of federal 
question jurisdiction.22  The interest in a correct and uniform inter-
pretation of federal law is no less potent when the party pressing a 
federal claim is the defendant rather than the plaintiff.23  And there is 
little reason to believe that plaintiffs who press federal claims are 
more likely to be the subjects of anti-federal bias on the part of state 
courts than are defendants who rely on federal law to support their 
claims.24  Yet the well-pleaded complaint rule, we have seen, forbids 
the exercise of federal question jurisdiction where the issue of federal 
law is introduced by the defendant rather than the plaintiff. 
Why did the Supreme Court adopt a jurisdictional rule that is at 
war with the core purposes of the constitutional and statutory grants 
of jurisdictional power?25  The answer lies in considerations of docket 
growth.”); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (offering an 
expansive construction of Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
22 See, e.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 12, at 188 (“The statutory construction that bars 
plaintiff from commencing in federal court, or defendant from removing thereto, a 
case in which there is a federal defense to a state-created claim . . . is inconsistent with 
the reasons that justify original federal question jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)); Do-
ernberg, supra note 9, at 600 (“[T]he Mottley rule is irrational because it is a mechani-
cal rule that ignores important policy considerations underlying the existence of fed-
eral question jurisdiction.”); see also, e.g., Cohen, supra note 20, at 894 (offering similar 
criticism of the Mottley rule); George B. Fraser, Jr., Some Problems in Federal Question Ju-
risdiction, 49 MICH. L. REV. 73, 76 (1950) (same); Hornstein, supra note 20, at 608 
(same).  But see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:  CRISIS AND REFORM 190 
(1985) (taking the position that the well-pleaded complaint rule “is not quite so arbi-
trary as it sounds,” because it is more likely that defendants will fashion frivolous de-
fenses in order to secure federal jurisdiction than it is that plaintiffs will fashion frivo-
lous federal causes of action for the same purpose). 
23 See, e.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 12, at 188-89 (noting, by way of example, that 
“[t]he labor union, wrongfully enjoined from picketing or striking because a state 
court has erroneously rejected its contention that the field in question is pre-empted 
by federal labor policies . . . is hurt at least as much as is the labor union wrongfully 
denied damages under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act because a state court has errone-
ously construed the reach of that section, and in each case there is similar harm to the 
interests represented by the federal law” (citation omitted)). 
24 See id. at 189 (“The alignment of parties to a lawsuit is often quite fortui-
tous . . . [and] seems irrelevant to any functional, or even rational, explanation of fed-
eral jurisdiction.  The dangers against which the jurisdiction guards are as likely to be 
met when federal law is relied on defensively as when it is relied on offensively.”); 
Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 9, at 660 (“Obviously, the presence in a particular case 
of the reasons of policy underlying federal jurisdiction are independent of which party 
introduces the federal question.”). 
25 Neither the text nor the legislative history of the Judiciary Act of 1875 supports 
the Court’s narrow reading of its jurisdictional grant.  See, e.g., Doernberg, supra note 
9, at 603 (“There is almost no legislative history concerning the intended scope of ‘aris-
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control.  The restriction of federal question jurisdiction to those cases 
in which the well-pleaded complaint rule is satisfied reduces the like-
lihood that the federal courts will be faced with a caseload that is be-
yond their capacity to process expeditiously.26  This is no post-hoc ra-
tionalization; docket-control concerns were highly salient during the 
quarter-century following the passage of the 1875 Act (during which 
time the Court decided the string of cases establishing the well-
pleaded complaint rule).27  In particular, the well-pleaded complaint 
rule helped to hold back the flood of litigation pertaining to western 
land grants, which was inundating the federal courts toward the end 
of the nineteenth century.28
ing under’ in the 1875 Act, but what little exists is unambiguous. . . . ‘This [statute] 
gives precisely the power which the Constitution confers—nothing more, nothing 
less.’” (quoting 2 CONG. REC. 4987 (1874) (statement of Sen. Carpenter))); Mishkin, 
supra note 20, at 160 (noting that the “arising under” language of the statute “sug-
gest[s] an intention to confer upon the national courts the full range of constitutional 
power over such cases” and that “[w]hat legislative history there is tends to confirm the 
inference”); see also Forrester, supra note 20, at 374-77 (similar); Fraser, supra note 22, 
at 74-75 (similar).  
26 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading:  A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 76 
TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1782 (1998) (explaining that the well-pleaded complaint rule re-
flects “concerns about the limited resources of the federal court system”); Mishkin, su-
pra note 20, at 162 (“To hold that the federal trial courts are actually invested with vir-
tually the full constitutional range of jurisdiction over federal questions might well 
flood the national courts thereby deflecting them from their real functions.”). 
 Professor Redish has argued vigorously against allowing considerations of docket-
control alone to guide decision making with respect to jurisdictional questions and, in 
this vein, has characterized the well-pleaded complaint rule as “highly dubious.”  Mar-
tin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts:  
Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles”, 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1794 (1992).  “If 
federal dockets are in need of reduction,” he claims, “the criteria for making such a 
reduction must be selected on the basis of a rational assessment of how particular 
groupings of cases would be served by the assertion of federal jurisdiction, not by the 
use of an approach that focuses on a convenient, but totally irrelevant, distinguishing 
factor.”  Id. at 1795.  While I do not share Professor Redish’s strong aversion to allow-
ing docket control considerations to drive judicial decisions as to the scope of federal 
jurisdiction, I agree that such decisions are best made in light of some systematic ac-
count of which cases are most in need of the solicitude of the federal courts.  Precisely 
this instinct motivates my analysis of complete preemption in Parts II and III, infra. 
27 See Cohen, supra note 20, at 903; Forrester, supra note 20, at 379 n.61. 
28 See ALI STUDY, supra note 12, app. c, at 482 (“If the Osborn construction had 
been applied to the statute, it would mean, for example, that virtually every case involv-
ing the title to land in the western states, where title descends from a grant from the 
United States, could be litigated in federal court.”); see also Shoshone Mining Co. v. 
Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507 (1900) (noting that if federal question jurisdiction were ex-
tended to its constitutional limit, “every action to establish title to real estate (at least in 
the newer States) would be such a one, as all titles in those States come from the 
United States or by virtue of its laws”).  Indeed, the Shoshone Mining case provides a 
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Thus, the well-pleaded complaint rule is simultaneously an inter-
pretation of the federal question statute and a rather broad species of 
exception to the principles underlying it.  The doctrine provides a 
mechanism for testing when jurisdiction will exist under § 1331, but 
the mechanism does not operate as one would expect, given the con-
cerns that motivated the enactment of the relevant language in Article 
III and § 1331 itself. 
C.  Exceptions to the Exception 
The well-pleaded complaint rule is not without exceptions of its 
own; the federal courts sometimes exercise jurisdiction under the fed-
eral question statute notwithstanding the fact that the cause of action 
stated by the plaintiff does not appear to be rooted in federal law.  
The remainder of this Article focuses on one such exception:  the doc-
trine of complete preemption—a jurisdictional rule that permits the 
exercise of federal question jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant’s 
presentation of a question of federal law.29
One might expect such tinkering at the margins of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction to be reserved for those cases in which, though no 
federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff’s complaint, the 
interest in securing a uniform interpretation of federal law or safe-
particularly strong indication of the Supreme Court’s concern with allowing these 
property matters into the federal courts; jurisdiction did not lie in that case even 
though, arguably, the well-pleaded complaint rule was satisfied.  See David L. Shapiro, 
Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 569-70 (1985). 
 A second justification frequently advanced in support of the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule is that it avoids the waste of resources that would accompany a system under 
which dispositive jurisdictional determinations were made at a later stage of litigation, 
or under which a plaintiff’s anticipation of a federal defense (one that may never actu-
ally materialize) would be sufficient to underwrite federal jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Miller, 
supra note 26, at 1783-84.  Of course, courts could make the necessary jurisdictional 
determination at a reasonably early stage of litigation without entirely excluding the 
defendant’s pleadings from the jurisdictional calculus.  A court could wait until the 
defendant’s answer were filed to make its jurisdictional decision, or it could require 
the defendant to file a special jurisdictional pleading prior to the filing of an answer.  
For similar suggestions, see Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question 
Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV. 717, 757 (1986); Robert A. Ragazzo, Reconsidering the Artful 
Pleading Doctrine, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 273, 318-19 (1993); Redish, supra note 26, at 1796-
97. 
29 The Justices who shaped the complete preemption doctrine would surely resist 
the claim that these cases authorize the exercise of federal jurisdiction on the basis of a 
defense.  But the Court’s rhetoric cannot mask the reality of what these cases do.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 96-104. 
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guarding against state court bias is most pressing.30  But it is difficult 
to explain the jurisprudence of complete preemption along these 
lines.  Indeed, if one consults the text of the Court’s complete pre-
emption cases, one finds almost nothing in the way of reference to 
these foundational jurisdictional policies; indeed, the doctrine does 
not appear to be predicated on any theory of federal jurisdiction.  As a 
result, rather than bringing the rules of federal question jurisdiction 
in line with the principles underlying its establishment, the doctrine 
serves only to muddle the jurisdictional picture. 
II.  COMPLETE PREEMPTION 
In a series of cases stretching back nearly forty years, the Court has 
established and elaborated upon a rule that authorizes the exercise of 
federal jurisdiction based upon the defendant’s invocation of federal 
law.  Specifically, the doctrine permits removal of a case to federal 
court if the defendant can demonstrate that the plaintiff’s claim is 
“completely preempted.”  For nearly all of the doctrine’s history, it was 
exceedingly difficult to tell what, exactly, it meant for a state-law claim 
to be completely preempted by federal law.  It was not until 2003, 
through the decision in Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson,31 that the 
Supreme Court cleared up much of this confusion.  That case indi-
cates that a state-law claim is completely preempted and, hence, may 
be removed to federal court, when federal law provides the exclusive 
cause of action for plaintiffs who wish to seek relief for the harm al-
leged.32
Though this decision has brought clarity to the doctrine, the ju-
risprudence of complete preemption remains, as it has always been, 
significantly undertheorized.  Indeed, if one consults the text of the 
relevant Supreme Court opinions, it is fair to say that it is entirely  
untheorized.  Complete preemption doctrine has developed haphaz-
30 See Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 818-19 (1986) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“[L]imitations on federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331 must be jus-
tified by careful consideration of the reasons underlying the grant of jurisdiction and 
the need for federal review.”); cf. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSI-
NESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 2 (1927) (“[P]rocedure is instrumental; it is the means 
of effectuating policy.”). 
31 539 U.S. 1 (2003).  The author served as a law clerk to Justice Scalia for the Oc-
tober 2002 Term, during which time Beneficial National Bank was decided.  The opin-
ions expressed in this Article are premised exclusively on publicly available informa-
tion. 
32 Id. at 8. 
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ardly, with scant attention paid to the basic principles underlying the 
establishment of federal question jurisdiction.  Most notably, the com-
plete preemption cases largely ignore the relationship between pre-
emption, federal jurisdiction, and the interest in a uniform interpreta-
tion of federal law. 
A.  Complete Preemption:  An Overview 
The general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), permits a de-
fendant to remove to federal court only if the plaintiff could have 
filed in the federal system as an initial matter.  When pieced together 
with the well-pleaded complaint rule, this means that a defendant may 
remove to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction 
only if the plaintiff has presented a cause of action that is created by 
federal law.33  If a plaintiff files a state-law claim in state court, § 1441 
provides no basis for removal (at least not on the basis of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction). 
The complete preemption doctrine is an exception to this rule.34  
It permits removal from state to federal court on the basis of federal 
question jurisdiction in cases in which the plaintiff’s statement of her 
own cause of action does not rest on federal law. 
The doctrine was established by the Supreme Court in 1968, in 
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, International Ass’n of Machinists.35  In 
that case, the plaintiff (Avco) had filed suit in state court to enjoin 
members and associates of the defendant union from striking at an 
Avco facility.36  The employer’s claim sounded in state contract law—it 
alleged that the union had violated the “no-strike” clause in the par-
ties’ collective bargaining agreement, which provided that grievances 
were to be settled amicably or through arbitration.37  The union 
sought to remove to federal court.38  Given the constraints of the well-
pleaded complaint rule (which had been around for at least sixty years 
by the time Avco was decided), this effort ought to have failed.  And, 
33 See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (ex-
plaining that, for purposes of the jurisdictional statutes, “[a] suit arises under the law 
that creates the cause of action”). 
34 There are others.  See infra text accompanying note 77 (noting the Supreme 
Court’s authorization of federal question jurisdiction when a plaintiff’s state law cause 
of action requires resolution of a “substantial question of federal law”). 
35 390 U.S. 557 (1968). 
36 Id. at 558. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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indeed, Avco insisted that, because its complaint was based squarely 
and exclusively on state contract law, the case could not have been 
filed initially in federal court and, hence, could not be removed.39
The Supreme Court disagreed.  In a unanimous decision, the 
Court determined that Avco’s suit was “within the ‘original jurisdic-
tion’ of the District Court” and that, as a corollary, removal was ap-
propriate.40  The basis for the Court’s holding is elusive.  It is clear 
that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) pro-
vided the jurisdictional basis for the suit,41 but the Court’s analysis 
confirms only that section 301 preempts certain state-law claims per-
taining to labor relations.42  Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, of 
course, the availability of a preemption defense ought not to have suf-
ficed to support federal question jurisdiction.  Indeed, thirty years 
prior, the Court had stated unequivocally that “a suit brought upon a 
state statute does not arise under an act of Congress or the Constitu-
tion of the United States because prohibited thereby”43—seemingly 
foreclosing the holding in Avco. 
The decision in Avco left many questions unanswered.  First, it 
failed to clarify when, exactly, the availability of a preemption defense 
would suffice to underwrite removal jurisdiction.  Second, and more 
fundamentally, it failed to explain why the relevant class of cases 
(whatever its contours) merits an exception to the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule.44  Indeed, the Court did not so much as mention the well-
pleaded complaint rule or give reasons for its abrogation.  Finally, 
even if there were good cause to afford the relevant class of cases spe-
cial jurisdictional treatment, the Court failed to explain why it is for 
the judiciary, and not Congress, to make this judgment and craft the 
appropriate jurisdictional rule. 
The Court revisited complete preemption doctrine periodically 
during the decades following its decision in Avco.  It held in Franchise 
39 See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 376 F.2d 337, 
339 (6th Cir. 1967). 
40 Avco, 390 U.S. at 560. 
41 Id. at 559-60. 
42 Id. 
43 Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 116 (1936). 
44 As I explain in Part II.B.2, see infra note 87 and accompanying text, the decision 
in Avco is probably best understood as an expression of judicial concern with state 
courts’ treatment of claims against labor unions.  But nothing on the face of the Avco 
opinion states as much, and subsequent Supreme Court cases applying the rule estab-
lished in Avco do not treat this factor as doctrinally relevant.  It is hardly surprising, 
then, that the decision has provoked more questions than it answered. 
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Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust that certain state-law 
claims brought by California taxing authorities were not completely 
preempted by section 502(a) of Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act (ERISA) (and, hence, could not be removed to federal 
court);45 and it held in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor that 
state-law claims brought against an employer by a group of former 
employees were completely preempted by that statute (and were there-
fore proper subjects of federal jurisdiction).46  In 1987, in Caterpillar, 
Inc. v. Williams, the Court returned to the statute at issue in Avco and 
held that state-law claims alleging breach of individual employment 
contracts were not completely preempted by section 301 of the 
LMRA.47
Even with the accretion of precedents during this period, the pre-
cise scope of complete preemption doctrine was impossible to pin 
down.48  In some instances, the Court appeared to take the position 
that preemption-based removal is permitted when federal law not only 
preempts state law, but also supplies a cause of action under which the 
plaintiff might have proceeded.49  At other times, however, application 
of the doctrine appeared to turn on the breadth of the preemptive 
federal law at issue.50  Neither of these approaches was explicitly en-
45 463 U.S. 1, 28 (1983). 
46 481 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1987). 
47 482 U.S. 386, 394-96 (1987).  The Court also held, in Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 
U.S. 470, 477-78 (1998), that a defendant’s assertion of a claim-preclusion defense 
provides no basis for application of the complete preemption doctrine.  This clarifica-
tion was necessitated by cryptic language in a footnote in the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2 (1981), which had 
been construed by some to establish the permissibility of removal on the basis of a pre-
clusion defense.  Rivet, 522 U.S. at 477-78. 
48 See Richard E. Levy, Comment, Federal Preemption, Removal Jurisdiction, and the 
Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 634, 652-55 (1984) (taking note of the 
confusion among the lower federal courts regarding the scope of complete preemp-
tion doctrine). 
49 Franchise Tax, 463 U.S. at 26 (“ERISA does not provide an alternative cause of 
action in favor of the State to enforce its rights, while § 301 expressly supplied the 
plaintiff in Avco with a federal cause of action to replace its pre-empted state contract 
claim.”).  When the Court finally did clarify the reach of the complete preemption 
doctrine, this was the rule it embraced.  See infra text accompanying notes 52-55. 
50 Id. at 25 (noting that ERISA “makes clear that Congress did not intend to pre-
empt entirely every state cause of action relating to such plans”).  During this period, 
commentators were divided over the proper understanding of complete preemption 
doctrine.  Compare Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., Comment, Artful Pleading and Removal Juris-
diction:  Ferreting Out the True Nature of a Claim, 35 UCLA L. REV. 315, 339-40 (1987) 
(“[T]he Court in Franchise Tax Board deemed that complete preemption or occupation 
of the field by federal law was the pivotal factor in deciding whether removal jurisdic-
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dorsed or rejected by the Justices, and a division of authority emerged 
among the lower federal courts as to the proper understanding of the 
complete preemption rule.51
The Court’s decision in Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson finally 
brought clarity to the doctrine.  In that case, the Court determined 
that state-law claims of usury brought against national banks are com-
pletely preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA) and, hence, are 
removable from state court.52  In the course of reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court explained that the complete preemption rule will take 
hold only if the defendant can show not only that the plaintiff’s claim 
is preempted by federal law, but that federal statutes “provide[] the 
exclusive cause of action for the claim asserted.”53  Where that is the 
case, the Court explained, “any complaint that comes within the scope 
of the federal cause of action,” even if it relies exclusively on state law, 
“necessarily ‘arises under’ federal law.”54  Because the NBA did, in 
fact, provide the exclusive cause of action for claims of usury against 
national banks, the Court concluded that “[e]ven though the com-
plaint ma[de] no mention of federal law,” plaintiffs’ cause of ac-
tion “only arises under federal law and could, therefore, be re-
moved.”55
In the wake of the decision in Beneficial National Bank, the confu-
sion that previously accompanied application of the complete pre-
emption rule has subsided considerably.  Numerous courts of appeals 
have now acknowledged that a preemptive federal regulatory regime 
tion was proper.”), with Mary P. Twitchell, Characterizing Federal Claims:  Preemption, Re-
moval, and the Arising-Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812, 
845 (1986) (“[Under Franchise Tax, it] is not enough merely to find some part of the 
complaint controlled by federal substantive law; a court must also find that plaintiff 
has a federal cause of action before recharacterizing the claim [as a federal one].” (ci-
tation omitted)). 
51 Compare, e.g., Ry. Labor Executives Ass’n v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 858 
F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that complete preemption takes hold only where 
Congress not only preempts state law, but also supplies a replacement cause of action 
through which plaintiffs might seek redress for the alleged injury), and Willy v. Coastal 
Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1988) (same), with, e.g., Deford v. Soo Line R.R. 
Co., 867 F.2d 1080, 1084-85 (8th Cir. 1989) (taking the position that the complete pre-
emption rule turns on the breadth of the preemptive provision), and Graf v. Elgin, 
Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 790 F.2d 1341, 1344-45 (7th Cir. 1986) (same). 
52 Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 10-11 (2003). 
53 Id. at 8. 
54 Id. at 7 (quoting Franchise Tax, 463 U.S. at 24). 
55 Id. at 11. 
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must provide the exclusive cause of action for a particular harm in or-
der for the rule to take hold.56
But even as the Court has made these strides toward doctrinal 
clarity, the theoretical questions that have plagued the complete pre-
emption rule since its creation remain unanswered.  In particular, the 
Court has made only the most unsatisfying efforts to explain why it 
carved out this exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule in the 
first place.  The best the Court has come up with by way of doctrinal 
justification is this passage from Franchise Tax: 
The necessary ground of decision [in Avco] was that the pre-emptive 
force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of ac-
tion “for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation.”  Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law, notwithstand-
ing the fact that state law would provide a cause of action in the absence 
of § 301.  Avco stands for the proposition that if a federal cause of action 
completely pre-empts a state cause of action[,] any complaint that comes 
within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily “arises under” 
federal law.
57
This explanation is entirely conclusory.  “It provides nothing more 
than an account of what Avco accomplishes, rather than a justifica-
tion . . . for [its] radical departure from the well-pleaded-complaint 
rule . . . .”58  Nevertheless, the Court has relied on this passage repeat-
edly in its complete preemption cases,59 and the doctrine has evolved 
56 See, e.g., Miles v. Okun, 430 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2005); City of Rome v. Ver-
izon Commcn’s, Inc., 362 F.3d 168, 177-78 (2d Cir. 2004); King v. Marriot Int’l, Inc., 
337 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2003); Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 775-76 
(5th Cir. 2003).. 
57 Franchise Tax, 463 U.S. at 23-24 (footnote omitted). 
58 Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. at 15 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
59 See id. at 7; Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987); Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64 (1987).  Scholars have offered similar—and 
therefore similarly unsatisfying—accounts of why removal is permitted in the complete 
preemption cases.  For example, Professor Oakley has argued that “complete preemp-
tion is better understood as an integral part of the general principles governing the 
existence of ordinary [arising under] jurisdiction over a claim that, in the final analy-
sis, exists only as a creature of federal law.”  John B. Oakley, Federal Jurisdiction and the 
Problem of the Litigative Unit:  When Does What “Arise Under” Federal Law?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
1829, 1845 (1998).  To say that a given claim “exists only as a creature of federal law” is 
to say that a plaintiff cannot prevail on such a claim if it is pleaded in state-law terms.  
It does not follow from this that a plaintiff who stupidly (or strategically) attempts to 
rely on state law to advance such a claim has actually pleaded a federal cause of action.  
See Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. at 20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that even if “the 
only viable claim against a national bank for usury is a federal one,” this does not mean 
that all claims of usury against a national bank—including those explicitly pleaded in 
state-law terms—are federal in character).   
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in a common-law-like fashion without meaningful clarification of its 
conceptual underpinnings. 
In particular, the Court has made no effort to anchor the doctrine 
of complete preemption in some broader vision of judicial federalism.  
The cases say next to nothing about the federal courts’ relative exper-
tise in the application of national law, the interest in securing a uni-
form interpretation of such law, or the need to sidestep state courts 
due to fear that localist bias might affect their decision making.  
Hence, even if we assume that the federal courts have authority to es-
tablish exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule,60 there is reason 
to doubt whether this authority has been exercised wisely. 
The Court’s failure to ground complete preemption jurispru-
dence in some broader jurisdictional policy is particularly baffling 
given the obvious relationship between congressional preemption of 
state law, on the one hand, and the interest in uniformity, on the 
other.  One important effect of federal preemption is the production 
of a measure of uniformity in connection with a particular regulatory 
rule through the disabling of state law that does not conform to the 
federal design.  As Professors Issacharoff and Sharkey recently ex-
plained, the power to preempt is deployed particularly aggressively 
“[w]hen what is at stake is a national, integrated scheme.”61  Thus, one 
of the core values that the federal courts are designed to serve—
 Parties advance nonviable claims all the time; and when they do, such claims are 
typically dismissed.  Neither the Court nor Professor Oakley explains why state-law 
claims that are not viable because they are “completely preempted” are transformed 
into federal claims.  See id. at 18-19 (“The proper response to the presentation of a 
nonexistent claim to a state court is dismissal, not the ‘federalize-and-remove’ dance 
authorized by today’s opinion.  For even if the Court is correct that the National Bank 
Act obliterates entirely any state-created right to relief for usury against a national 
bank, that does not explain how or why the claim of such a right is transmogrified into 
the claim of a federal right.”).  It is no answer to say that the federal courts’ authority 
to “transform” a plaintiff’s complaint in this fashion is a component part of their power 
to construe judicial pleadings.  Whatever the precise contours of that power, it has 
long been disciplined by the maxim that “the plaintiff [is] the master of the claim; he 
or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.”  Caterpillar, 482 
U.S. at 392 (citation omitted). 
60 The Court also has made no effort to justify its assumption of authority to fash-
ion an exception to the baseline jurisdictional rule.  Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion 
in Beneficial National Bank focuses a great deal of attention on this issue.  See infra note 
107. 
61 Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 1353, 1370 (2006).  The authors also emphasize the capacity of preemption “to 
prevent states from imposing externalities on each other or to overcome the inability 
to rationalize coordinated national standards for goods and services.”  Id. 
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securing uniformity—might be implicated with special force when is-
sues of federal-state preemption are at stake.  It would have made 
good sense, then, for the Court to link the special jurisdictional rule it 
created to the nature and intensity of the federal interest in assuring 
uniform regulation within a given sphere.  But the Court has done 
nothing of the sort,62 and the reason the doctrine has assumed its cur-
rent form remains opaque. 
B.  Complete Preemption and Jurisdictional Policy 
1.  Congressional Intent? 
The Court’s apparent neglect in the complete preemption cases 
of core jurisdictional values might be excusable if the doctrine were 
somehow rooted in congressional intent.  For while it is true that good 
reasons to broaden the scope of federal question jurisdiction must be 
grounded in the interests in uniformity and in channeling federal 
claims away from potentially hostile state courts, Congress may expand 
such jurisdiction for good reasons or bad, so long as it stays within 
Osborn’s expansive boundaries.  Thus, where it is clear that Congress 
intends to allow removal on the basis of a defendant’s presentation of 
a preemption defense (or, for that matter, any other federal de-
fense),63 removal must be permitted.  This is true regardless of 
whether a judge believes (or traditional jurisdictional policies suggest) 
that it is important that the federal courts be available to decide the 
matter. 
It is difficult, however, to understand the doctrine of complete 
preemption as the product of a rigorous or sound judicial inquiry into 
congressional intent.  Many of the cases in this line—Avco, Franchise 
Tax, and Caterpillar—do not discuss congressional intent at all.  As to 
62 Indeed, the entire body of complete preemption jurisprudence contains but 
two passing references to the interest in uniformity.  See Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 
542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (“The purpose of ERISA is to provide a uniform regulatory 
regime over employee benefit plans.”); Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 
10 (2003) (“Uniform rules limiting the liability of national banks and prescribing ex-
clusive remedies for their overcharges are an integral part of a banking system that 
needed protection from ‘possible unfriendly State legislation.’” (quoting Tiffany v. 
Nat’l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 412 (1873))).  Neither of these cases con-
nects the dots between preemption, uniformity, and federal jurisdiction. 
63 See, e.g., El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 484 (1999) (noting 
that “the Price-Anderson Act transforms into a federal action ‘any public liability ac-
tion arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident,’” even if that action sounds in 
state law (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2210(a)(2))). 
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these, the Court’s failure to frame its thinking around the core pur-
poses of federal question jurisdiction does not appear to be a product 
of deference to legislative will. 
Other complete preemption cases do confront the question of 
congressional intent.  Thus, the Taylor Court stated that “the touch-
stone of the federal district court’s removal jurisdiction is . . . the in-
tent of Congress” and noted, in this vein, that “Congress ha[d] clearly 
manifested an intent to make [the relevant] causes of action . . . re-
movable to federal court.”64  In Beneficial National Bank, however, (and 
again in Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila65) the Court insisted that “the 
proper inquiry focuses on whether Congress intended the federal 
cause of action to be exclusive rather than on whether Congress in-
tended that the cause of action be removable.”66  This shift in focus—
from inquiring directly whether Congress intended to create removal 
jurisdiction to inquiring whether Congress intended to create an ex-
clusive federal cause of action—is sensible only if the latter is a good 
proxy for the former.67  For if Congress’s decision to create an exclu-
sive cause of action for a particular injury is not motivated, at least in 
64 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987); see also id. at 68 (Brennan, 
J., concurring) (stating that “a clear congressional intent to create removal jurisdiction” 
is necessary to justify application of the complete preemption rule). 
65 542 U.S. 200, 208-09 (2004). 
66 Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. at 9 n.5. 
67 One could attempt to justify the shift in the Court’s understanding of what sort 
of congressional intent is relevant on the ground that the National Bank Act was 
passed prior to Congress’s establishment of general federal question jurisdiction and 
general removal jurisdiction.  For such a statute, it could be argued, an expression of 
specific intent to create removal jurisdiction could not reasonably be expected, and so 
it would make sense for the courts to seek some other sign of legislative intent to pro-
vide expansive federal jurisdiction.  See Spellman v. Meridian Bank, Nos. 94-3203, 94-
3209, 94-3215 to 94-3218, 1995 WL 764548, at *21 (3d Cir. Feb. 16, 1995) (Scirica, J., 
dissenting in part) (“We could not expect the Congress which enacted the National 
Bank Act to have discussed the federal question jurisdiction or removal implications of 
12 U.S.C. §§ 85 & 86, since neither general federal question jurisdiction nor general 
removal power existed in 1864.”).  But it was, of course, entirely possible for Congress 
specifically to authorize removal of claims falling within the preemptive scope of the 
National Bank Act.  It declined to do so.  Given that specific removal statutes were 
hardly unfamiliar in the early- and mid-nineteenth century, see supra notes 16-17, infra 
note 75 and accompanying text, it seems fair to draw a negative inference from Con-
gress’s failure to provide for removal here.  Moreover, the Court gave no indication in 
Beneficial National Bank that the method it announced for identifying the requisite 
congressional intent was limited to preemptive federal laws that predate passage of the 
removal statute.  To the contrary, Beneficial National Bank purports to provide a post-
hoc justification for prior applications of the complete preemption rule, 539 U.S. at 8, 
each of which involved statutes passed long after Congress had provided for general 
removal jurisdiction. 
  
2007] THE PUZZLE OF COMPLETE PREEMPTION 557 
 
part, by jurisdictional concerns, then there is little reason for this de-
cision to serve as the touchstone of an intent-based inquiry into re-
moval jurisdiction.68
The relationship between Congress’s creation of an exclusive 
cause of action and the intended scope of federal question jurisdic-
tion proves to be a complex one.  Perhaps the most salient effect of 
Congress’s establishment of a private cause of action is the opening of 
the federal courts to individuals who wish to vindicate their rights un-
der federal law.69  Where Congress declines to create a cause of action 
through which plaintiffs might secure relief for the violation of federal 
law, the basic rules of statutory federal question jurisdiction afford no 
access to the federal courts.70  It therefore cannot be disputed that 
Congress’s establishment of a private cause of action for the violation 
of a particular federal law has at least some jurisdictional ramifica-
tions. 
Where Congress takes the added step of rendering a cause of ac-
tion exclusive—that is, where it simultaneously provides a cause of ac-
tion for the vindication of federal rights and preempts state-law causes 
of action for the injury in question—the instinct to presume a jurisdic-
tion-based motivation is stronger still.  By preempting all state-law 
causes of action that would otherwise be available alongside the fed-
eral one, Congress effectively decrees that all viable claims for redress 
of a particular harm are eligible for federal jurisdiction.  This is the 
case because a plaintiff who wishes to secure relief for the harm at is-
sue can do so only by filing under federal law.  And such a filing may 
be ushered into the federal courts either by the plaintiff in the first 
instance or by the defendant through a petition to remove.71  Accord-
68 Justice Scalia, for one, has taken the position that “Congress’s mere act of creat-
ing a federal right and eliminating all state-created rights in no way suggests an expan-
sion of federal jurisdiction so as to wrest from state courts the authority to decide ques-
tions of pre-emption under the [relevant federal statute].”  Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 
U.S. at 19 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
69 A straightforward application of the well-pleaded complaint rule allows a plain-
tiff who presents a cause of action grounded in a federal statute to file in federal court.  
See supra notes 9-11, 32 and accompanying text. 
70 I refer to the “basic” rules of jurisdiction because there are subrules of federal 
question jurisdiction (other than the complete preemption rule) that occasionally 
permit its exercise even when no federal cause of action is available.  See infra text ac-
companying note 77. 
71
This is not something that Congress could accomplish either by preempting 
state-law causes of action without providing a replacement right of action under fed-
eral law, or, conversely, by creating a private right of action under federal law without 
preempting state-law claims.  In the former scenario, the absence of a cause of action 
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ingly, when Congress takes the trouble simultaneously to create a pri-
vate right of action and eliminate otherwise available state-law causes 
of action, it would appear to be sending a strong jurisdictional mes-
sage:  we mean for parties litigating over the relevant class of injuries 
to have access to the federal courts.  If this is right, then the Court’s 
placement of dispositive jurisdictional weight on the exclusive-cause-
of-action construct is entirely sensible. 
But this line of reasoning suffers from at least two flaws.  First, the 
“jurisdictional” account of why Congress might create an exclusive 
cause of action in connection with a preemptive regulatory scheme 
simply does not hold together in certain contexts.  For example, it is 
difficult to sustain the notion that the Congress that enacted the NBA 
saw a pressing need to assure federal court availability in cases involv-
ing that statute.  It is true that the NBA explicitly allowed plaintiffs to 
file suit for NBA violations in federal court, but it permitted filings in 
state court as well.72  With no general removal statute in place at the 
time (and no specific statute authorizing removal of claims arising 
under the NBA), there was nothing to prevent plaintiffs from filing 
such claims in state court and keeping them there.  And, of course, if 
we proceed from the premise that state courts were more likely to be 
hostile to national banks than federal courts, we would expect plain-
tiffs to do exactly that, and the presumed purpose of Congress’s estab-
lishment of an exclusive cause of action would thereby be thoroughly 
undermined. 
Moreover, a mere four years after the passage of the NBA, Con-
gress enacted a statute authorizing corporations organized under fed-
eral law to remove cases to federal court if they raised a defense 
grounded in federal law.73  Yet national banks were expressly excepted 
from this statute.74  It is exceedingly difficult to reconcile the exclu-
sion of national banks from this removal provision with the notion 
that Congress was seriously concerned that NBA claims be eligible for 
federal jurisdiction.  Congress’s establishment of an exclusive federal 
cause of action in the NBA still left a sizeable hole through which 
cases might slip into the state courts; given the opportunity to patch 
this hole up, Congress took a pass.  At least in this context, then, the 
under federal law eliminates any conventional basis for the assertion of federal juris-
diction.  And in the latter scenario, a plaintiff may assure that litigation occurs in the 
state courts by filing state-law claims only. 
72 Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 57, 13 Stat. 99, 116-17. 
73 Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 255, §§ 1-2, 15 Stat. 226, 226-27. 
74 Id. § 2, 15 Stat. at 227. 
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creation of an exclusive federal cause of action and a strong desire to 
channel cases into the federal courts appear not to go hand in hand.75
Second, and more broadly, the analysis above runs together two 
congressional decisions—the decision to preempt state-law causes of 
action and the decision to create a federal one—that are sometimes 
best understood independently of one another.  It thereby ignores the 
possibility that the jurisdictional consequences of establishing an ex-
clusive federal cause of action might be nothing more than a byprod-
uct of Congress’s desire to serve other goals of a nonprocedural na-
ture. 
Specifically, the decision to preempt state-law causes of action is 
frequently motivated, above all else, by an interest in securing a par-
ticular regulatory outcome.  Preemption of state-law claims forecloses 
the possibility that conduct will be actionable under terms other than 
those spelled out under federal law (assuming federal law deems the 
covered conduct actionable at all).  And this, in turn, encourages 
regulated entities to behave in light of the incentives established by 
federal statutes and regulations alone. 
The decision to establish a private right of action, meanwhile, may 
be driven by a sense that public enforcement will prove inadequate to 
assure compliance with the relevant federal rules or by a sense that 
individual victims of violations of these rules ought to have access to 
judicial redress.  Conversely, the decision not to provide such a cause 
of action may reflect a congressional judgment that public enforce-
ment is sufficient to trigger the desired response from regulated enti-
ties or that public enforcement will prove more efficient.  From this 
perspective, attribution of significant jurisdictional weight to the pres-
ence or absence of a cause of action within a preemptive federal regu-
latory scheme seems misguided.76
75 The establishment of an exclusive federal cause of action in the National Bank 
Act likewise had only a limited effect on the availability of Supreme Court review.  Un-
der then-prevailing jurisdictional rules, that Court would be available to hear cases in-
volving claims of usury against national banks—even those arising under state law—
whenever a state court ruled against the federal claimant.  Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 
§ 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87.  If a state court upheld a claim of federal preemption, Supreme 
Court jurisdiction was lacking under the rules applicable at the time the National Bank 
Act was enacted.  See id. 
76 It would be possible, I suppose, for Congress to supply a private federal cause of 
action for a violation of federal law and preempt state-law actions only to the extent 
that they deviate from the measure and form of relief made available under federal 
law.  Under this scheme, state-law causes of action that duplicate the cause of action 
created by the federal government would be viable.  Cf., e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences 
L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431, 447 (2005) (noting that the preemption provision in the Federal 
  
560 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 537 
 
Indeed, in a distinct but related pocket of the law of federal juris-
diction—one that also involves judicial tinkering with the well-pleaded 
complaint rule—the Court recently rejected the suggestion that the 
availability of the federal courts to hear claims under a federal statute 
ought to turn entirely on whether Congress has included a private 
right of action in the relevant regulatory scheme.  Since the early 
twentieth century, the Supreme Court has authorized the assertion of 
federal question jurisdiction over state-law causes of action so long as 
the plaintiff’s right to relief under that cause of action depends on 
the resolution of a “substantial question of federal law.”77  In Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, however, the Court held that there 
was no federal question jurisdiction over a state-law claim that would 
require interpretation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA).78  The Court’s conclusion rested in large part on the fact that 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000), permits tort 
actions to enforce state-law labeling requirements, so long as these requirements are 
“equivalent to, and fully consistent with, FIFRA’s misbranding provisions”).  Moreover, 
the substantive goals I have posited for Congress—regulatory precision and assuring 
the possibility of judicial redress for victims—could be secured without rendering the 
federal cause of action exclusive.  This, in turn, raises the question of what purpose is 
served by the exclusivity of a federal cause of action, and it revives the possibility that 
the answer might relate to jurisdictional concerns. 
 But this all seems rather tortured.  Creation of an exclusive cause of action is the 
most straightforward way to assure that judicial remedies are available to private liti-
gants—but only on the precise terms provided by federal law.  Congress might think it 
redundant to permit state-law causes of action to proceed only if they duplicate federal 
law.  Moreover, if duplicative state-law actions are permitted, this would likely provoke 
litigation over whether such actions are, in fact, identical to the relevant provisions of 
federal law.  So while it is possible to spin out an account under which Congress’s es-
tablishment of an exclusive federal cause of action is left wanting for substantive ex-
planation (thus inviting the jurisdiction-based justification), it is doubtful that this ac-
count accurately reflects the motives underlying Congress’s establishment of this sort 
of preemptive/remedial scheme.  I am aware of no direct evidence in the text or legis-
lative history of these statutes to support the jurisdictional account of why Congress 
creates an exclusive cause of action. 
77 See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 
1, 28 (1983).  In the seminal case in this line, Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 
U.S. 180 (1921), the Court permitted the exercise of federal question jurisdiction over 
a state cause of action to enjoin the purchase of certain bonds.  The plaintiff argued 
that (1) state law forbade the defendant corporation from investing in bonds that had 
not been issued under a valid law, and (2) the bonds in question were issued pursuant 
to a federal statute that violated the U.S. Constitution.  Id. at 198.  Notwithstanding the 
fact that the plaintiff’s cause of action was created by state law, the Supreme Court de-
termined that the case fell within the federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts 
because “the controversy concerns the constitutional validity of an act of Congress 
which is directly drawn in question.”  Id. at 201. 
78 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986). 
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the FDCA did not include a private cause of action for violations of 
the federal regulations at issue.79
But in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & 
Manufacturing,80 a unanimous Court recently rejected the proposition 
that the existence of federal question jurisdiction under this doctrine 
turned exclusively on whether the federal scheme at issue includes a 
private right of action.81  The Court explicitly disclaimed language 
from Merrell Dow suggesting as much and explained that “questions of 
jurisdiction over state-law claims require ‘careful judgments’ . . . about 
the ‘nature of the federal interest at stake,’” rather than a narrow in-
quiry into whether the federal scheme includes a private right of ac-
tion.82  In making the necessary “careful judgments,” the Court ex-
plained, “the absence of a federal private right of action [is] 
relevant . . . but not dispositive.”83  The Court’s reasoning here echoes 
that of Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion in Merrell Dow.  “Why,” 
Justice Brennan asked, “should the fact that Congress chose not to 
create a private federal remedy mean that Congress would not want 
there to be federal jurisdiction to adjudicate a state claim that imposes 
liability for violating the federal law?”84
For all of these reasons, it is unwise to assume that Congress’s 
creation of an exclusive private cause of action must be charged with 
jurisdictional meaning.  Yet complete preemption doctrine appears to 
rest on precisely this assumption. 
2.  Is the Court onto Something? 
It is possible that, notwithstanding the Court’s failure explicitly to 
ground its decisions in some account of the relationship between pre-
79 Id. at 814 (“[T]he congressional determination that there should be no federal 
remedy for the violation of this federal statute is tantamount to a congressional conclu-
sion that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state 
cause of action is insufficiently ‘substantial’ to confer federal-question jurisdiction.”). 
80 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
81 Id. at 311-12. 
82 Id. at 317 (quoting Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814, 814-15 n.12) (citation omitted). 
83 Id. at 318. 
84 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 825 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  The decision not to pro-
vide a private right of action and, instead, to allow for public enforcement “reflects 
congressional concern with obtaining more accurate implementation and more coor-
dinated enforcement of a regulatory scheme.”  Id. at 832.  And, of course, these con-
cerns need not entail congressional hostility to the exercise of federal jurisdiction 
where interpretation of the relevant federal regulations is necessary to the disposition 
of a plaintiff’s state-law claim.  See id. at 829-32. 
  
562 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 537 
 
emption and the purposes underlying the grant of federal question 
jurisdiction, the Court has crafted a doctrine that can be justified in 
such terms.  Were this true, the Court’s failure expressly to connect 
the analytic dots would remain lamentable, but it would not signal 
that the doctrine is altogether wrongheaded. 
Inquiry along these lines turns out to mirror the analysis of con-
gressional intent undertaken in the previous section.  This is because 
the question of legislative intent, in this context, is necessarily one of 
constructive intent.  This is so because the statutes at issue in the com-
plete preemption cases do not explicitly command creation of the ju-
risdictional rule crafted by the Court; nor do the legislative histories of 
the provisions that fall within the ambit of the complete preemption 
rule contain relevant signals of the intended jurisdictional conse-
quences of the preemptive and remedial schemes crafted by Con-
gress.85  Hence, when we ask whether the doctrine of complete pre-
emption can be justified by reference to congressional intent, we are 
unavoidably asking whether a sensible Congress would have wanted 
the jurisdictional consequences of this doctrine to issue in the covered 
cases.  To answer this question, one must assess whether an unusually 
strong interest in uniformity or potent fear of state-court bias is impli-
cated in such cases.  And it should come as no surprise, given the 
analysis above,86 that the exclusive cause of action construct proves too 
85 Section 502(a) of ERISA (the provision deemed completely preemptive in Tay-
lor) is an exception of sorts.  As the Supreme Court emphasized in Taylor, “the lan-
guage of the jurisdictional subsection of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions closely 
parallels that of § 301 of the LMRA,” and this triggers a strong presumption that Con-
gress intended the jurisdictional rules governing the relevant provisions of ERISA to 
mirror those applicable under LMRA section 301.  Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 
U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987); see also id. (quoting portions of the legislative history of ERISA to 
illustrate that the enacting Congress intended the jurisdictional rules governing ER-
ISA’s civil enforcement provision to parallel those applicable under section 301 of the 
LMRA).  Of course, if it followed ineluctably from Congress’s creation of an exclusive 
federal cause of action that the legislature intended to establish a jurisdictional regime 
like that concocted in Avco, there would be no need to point to legislative history ref-
erencing the Avco rule to illustrate that Congress in fact intended to allow for preemp-
tion-based removal.  Yet the Taylor Court indicated that, but for the “specific reference 
to the Avco rule,” id. at 66, in the legislative history of ERISA, it would have been reluc-
tant to deem the relevant provision of ERISA completely preemptive, id. at 65.  So, the 
legislative history of ERISA may well send the signal that Congress intended the com-
plete preemption rule to apply to causes of action falling within the scope of ERISA 
section 502(a)(1)(B)—but it does not suggest that any time Congress establishes an 
exclusive federal cause of action, it intends these same jurisdictional consequences. 
86 See supra text accompanying notes 77-84. 
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blunt an instrument to perform the task of singling out those cases in 
which these fundamental jurisdictional policies are at issue. 
To be sure, a narrative of state court bias has considerable pur-
chase in connection with the LMRA (the statute deemed completely 
preemptive in Avco).87  But this hardly proves that whenever Congress 
creates an exclusive private right of action under federal law, it does 
so out of concern that state courts cannot be trusted to vindicate the 
relevant federal rights.  Indeed, there is little basis upon which to con-
struct a state judicial bias narrative in connection with section 502(a) 
of ERISA (the statute at issue in Taylor);88 and while a bias-based ac-
count of the NBA has surface appeal, this approach founders upon 
careful examination.89  By the same token, there can be no doubt that 
87 There is considerable evidence that the Congress that enacted the LMRA was 
deeply concerned about the capacity and willingness of state courts to enforce collec-
tive bargaining agreements against labor unions.  See, e.g., Charles Dowd Box Co. v. 
Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 510 (1962) (“A principal motive behind the creation of federal 
jurisdiction in this field was the belief that the courts of many States could provide 
only imperfect relief because of rules of local law which made suits against labor or-
ganizations difficult or impossible, by reason of their status as unincorporated associa-
tions.”); see also S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 421 (1947) (“The laws of many States make it dif-
ficult to sue effectively and to recover a judgment against an unincorporated labor 
union.”).  Justice Frankfurter’s opinions in Ass’n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 439-61 (1955) (plurality opinion), and Textile 
Union Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 460-546 (1957) (dis-
senting opinion), contain extensive discussion of the legislative history of the LMRA 
and provide robust support for this claim as well.  See also Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 43 (1985) (noting that “[t]he 
primary motivation for conferring federal jurisdiction [in LMRA section 301] was to 
avoid parochialism or bias on the part of state courts”).  Hence, the most likely expla-
nation for the Supreme Court’s decision in Avco (though the Court does not bother to 
say so), is that the Justices were responding to these very concerns. 
88 Evidence of congressional concern with state court bias in connection with the 
sorts of claims at issue in section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA is lacking.  While there can be 
little doubt that ERISA was designed to crowd state legislatures out of the field of pen-
sion plan regulation, see generally Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46-47 
(1987), and that that statute was designed to assure “ready access to the Federal 
courts,” 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000), I am aware of no evidence that Congress was spe-
cifically concerned that state courts might be uncharitable to parties raising claims 
under that statute.  Indeed, while federal jurisdiction over the lion’s share of ERISA’s 
civil enforcement provisions is exclusive, jurisdiction over claims arising under sec-
tion 502(a)(1)(B) is concurrent with the state courts, see 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (2000) 
(codifying § 502 of ERISA); this suggests that, relative to other claims arising under 
ERISA, Congress was actually more trusting of state courts’ capacity to adjudicate claims 
under section 502(a)(1)(B) fairly. 
89 The Bank Act was passed in 1864.  Although decades had passed since the 
pitched battles over the legitimacy of federal banking operations that spawned the 
momentous decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), wide-
spread hostility among the states to national banks loomed large in the minds of those 
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who drafted that statute.  As the Supreme Court explained in Tiffany v. National Bank of 
Missouri: 
It was expected [that national banks] would come into competition with State 
banks, and [the Act] was intended to give them at least equal advantages in 
such competition.  In order to accomplish this they were empowered to re-
serve interest at the same rates, whatever those rates might be, which were al-
lowed to similar State institutions.  This was considered indispensable to pro-
tect them against possible unfriendly State legislation.  Obviously, if State 
statutes should allow to their banks of issue a rate of interest greater than the 
ordinary rate allowed to natural persons, National banking associations could 
not compete with them, unless allowed the same.  On the other hand, if such 
associations were restricted to the rates allowed by the statutes of the State to 
banks which might be authorized by the State laws, unfriendly legislation 
might make their existence in the State impossible. 
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 412-13 (1873).  Indeed, Justice Stevens relied on this passage to 
support the Court’s conclusion that the National Bank Act is, in fact, completely pre-
emptive of state law usury claims against national banks.  See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. 
Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 10 (2003) (quoting Tiffany, 85 U.S. at 409). 
 But it does not follow from the fact that national banks might be subject to un-
friendly state legislation that state courts are likely to exhibit bias against such banks by 
giving short shrift to claims of preemption under the National Bank Act.  See Anderson 
v. H&R Block, Inc., 287 F.3d 1038, 1045 (11th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom. Beneficial 
Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003) (“While the congressional debates [relating 
to the enactment of the National Bank Act] amply demonstrate Congress’s desire to 
protect national banks from state legislation, they do not demonstrate that Congress 
desired to protect national banks from facing suit in state court.”).  One might, I sup-
pose, take the position that state legislative bias and state judicial bias go hand in hand, 
and that it therefore makes sense to attach jurisdictional consequences to Congress’s 
enactment of legislation that is driven by concern with the former.  But the effects for 
our scheme of federal jurisdiction of lumping together state legislatures and courts in 
this fashion are potentially vast.  (In the extreme, it could be argued that this calls for 
federal jurisdiction whenever Congress preempts state law.)  Hence, one would expect 
an argument that rests on the supposition that state judicial bias is inferable from state 
legislative bias to offer something in the way of explanation.  Justice Stevens’s opinion 
in Beneficial National Bank provides none. 
 Moreover, as noted already, see supra text accompanying notes 63-68, given Con-
gress’s failure to provide for removal of claims raised under the National Bank Act 
and, more strikingly, its subsequent exclusion of national banks from the class of fed-
erally chartered corporations authorized to remove to federal court upon the presen-
tation of a federal defense, it is hard to sustain the proposition that Congress’s estab-
lishment of an exclusive federal cause of action in the National Bank Act was motivated 
by concern with state judicial bias.  See Jones v. Bankboston, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 
1360-61 (S.D. Ala. 2000) (“Congress necessarily recognized that claims against national 
banks for excessive interest—even if expressly based on the National Bank Act—would 
remain in state court if filed in state court.  Congress had the power to preclude state 
court jurisdiction of such claims, but elected not to exercise this prerogative.” (foot-
note omitted)).  Note, in particular, that if we proceed from the premise that state 
courts are more likely to exhibit hostility to national banks than federal courts, then 
plaintiffs wishing to pursue usury claims against such banks would be more likely to 
file their claims in the state courts, notwithstanding the existence of original federal 
jurisdiction over such claims.  Under the rules crafted by Congress, such claims would 
not be removable.  One has to wonder, then, whether the National Bank Act is prop-
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the broadly preemptive scheme enacted in ERISA was motivated by 
congressional interest in securing a uniform regulatory rule with re-
spect to the covered activities.90  But this tells us nothing about 
whether the establishment of an exclusive cause of action in connec-
tion with the statutory scheme was itself driven by the uniformity con-
cern; nor, of course, does it speak to whether uniformity is a promi-
nent concern whenever federal preemption is accompanied by the 
creation of a private cause of action. 
As to this last point, it bears repeating that if we disaggregate the 
decision to preempt state law from the decision to create a private 
right of action, it is easy to construct a narrative under which the exis-
tence of such a right of action within a preemptive federal regulatory 
regime is largely unrelated to the interest in a uniform interpretation 
of federal law.  The interest in uniformity is served in overwhelming 
part by preemption—by the disabling of state and local rules that fail 
to conform to federal standards.  The question of whether to allow en-
forcement of the federal scheme through a private right of action may 
run along an entirely different track.91
Indeed, there are numerous contexts in which the interest in a 
uniform interpretation of federal law is indisputably strong, yet Con-
gress has not created a private cause of action (exclusive or otherwise) 
through which private parties can seek relief for violations.  In some 
cases, this is likely because Congress prefers public over private en-
forcement.92  In others, Congress might allow for private actions by 
erly aligned with the LMRA as an example of a statute in connection with which the 
solicitude of the federal courts might be badly needed due to concern with state judi-
cial bias. 
90 See, e.g., Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 46 (quoting Senator Williams’s statement that 
“‘the substantive and enforcement provisions of [ERISA] are intended to preempt the 
field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent 
State and local regulation of employee benefit plans’”); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 
463 U.S. 85, 99-100 n.20 (1983) (quoting Senator Javits’s statement that “the emer-
gence of a comprehensive and pervasive Federal interest and the interests of uniform-
ity with respect to interstate plans required—but for certain exceptions—the dis-
placement of State action in the field of private employee benefit programs”). 
91 See supra Part II.B.1.   
92 For example, the Court has acknowledged the need for uniform federal regula-
tion of oil-tanker safety under the Port and Waterways Safety Act, see Ray v. Atl. Rich-
field Co., 435 U.S. 151, 165-68 (1978) (preempting state law requirements that were 
more stringent than their federal counterparts), and it has emphasized the broadly 
preemptive scope of title II of that statute, see United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 111 
(2000) (noting that “Congress has left no room for state regulation” of oil-tanker 
safety).  Yet Congress has eschewed private enforcement in that context in favor of en-
forcement through civil and criminal penalties and fines.  See 46 U.S.C. § 3718 (2000) 
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parties injured as a result of violations of a federal statute, but channel 
such disputes away from the federal courts (at least in the first in-
stance) by providing for administrative remedies.93  In these circum-
stances, Congress’s failure to create a private cause of action, enforce-
able in federal court, does not remotely suggest a diminished interest 
in a uniform interpretation of the law.94
Hence, while it is possible to make sense of the outcomes in some 
of the complete preemption cases by reference to the core policies 
underlying the creation of federal question jurisdiction (Avco appears 
to be a bias case; Taylor appears to be a uniformity case), the doctrinal 
test crafted by the Court remains wanting for justification.  The fact 
that a federal statute establishes the exclusive cause of action for a 
particular kind of harm is both an unsure indicator that fundamental 
jurisdictional policies are implicated with unique force and signifi-
cantly underinclusive as a means of singling out those preemptive fed-
eral statutes in connection with which the interest in uniformity is un-
usually potent.95  Yet current doctrine dictates that the question of 
whether a preemptive federal regulatory scheme is eligible for de-
fense-based removal turns squarely on whether that scheme contains 
such a right of action. 
3.  Understanding Complete Preemption:   
Anxiety About Exceptions? 
The Court has declined explicitly to link the jurisprudence of 
complete preemption to basic jurisdictional policies.  And, as the pre-
(detailing the penalties applicable for violations of federal laws governing oil tankers 
and declining to include the possibility of a private damages action). 
93 See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 
(1959) (holding that enforcement of sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations 
Act is to be through actions filed before the National Labor Relations Board, not the 
courts). 
94 Indeed, where Congress opts for administrative remedies, rather than enforce-
ment through the state or federal courts, the uniformity interest may be more potent 
than ever.  See, e.g., id. at 242-43 (“Congress evidently considered that centralized ad-
ministration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform applica-
tion of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result 
from a variety of local procedures and attitudes towards labor controversies.” (quoting 
Garner v. Teamsters Local Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953))). 
95 Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 20-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining that “there is no more reason to fear state-court error with respect to federal 
pre-emption accompanied by creation of a federal cause of action than there is with 
respect to federal pre-emption unaccompanied by creation of a federal cause of ac-
tion”). 
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vious section demonstrates, the construct that lies at the heart of the 
doctrine is not particularly useful as a means of detecting those cases 
in which these policies are specially implicated.  So the question re-
mains:  how can we best explain the Court’s decision to treat the exis-
tence of an exclusive federal cause of action as the hinge on which the 
door to the federal courthouse swings? 
The Court may have hinted at the answer to these questions 
through its repeated insistence that completely preempted state-law 
claims are “necessarily . . . federal.”96  As noted earlier, this fragment 
of the Court’s reasoning is entirely conclusory.97  It is one thing to 
treat claims that have been framed in state-law terms as if they are 
“necessarily federal” and quite another to explain why such claims are 
federal in character, the plaintiff’s characterization notwithstanding.98  
Conclusory though it is, this aspect of the Court’s thinking may pro-
vide significant insight into why the doctrine has assumed its current 
form. 
A crucial consequence of the decision to conceptualize completely 
preempted state-law claims as “necessarily federal” is that it allows the 
Court to claim that the doctrine does not mark an exception to the 
longstanding well-pleaded complaint rule.  Indeed, the Court has 
scrupulously avoided characterizing complete preemption doctrine in 
this way, choosing instead to label the doctrine a “corollary” of that 
principle.99  In this vein, the Court has not stated that the defense of 
complete preemption allows the federal courts to exercise removal ju-
risdiction over the plaintiff’s state-law claims; rather, the Court has in-
sisted that completely preemptive federal laws require courts to convert 
a plaintiff’s improperly pleaded state-law claim into a federal one, and 
to proceed as if the plaintiff’s complaint actually included a claim aris-
96 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
97 See supra text accompanying notes 56-59. 
98 As noted earlier, see supra note 59, the Court’s usual practice dictates that “the 
plaintiff [is] the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclu-
sive reliance on state law.”  Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 
99 See Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (“Allied as an ‘inde-
pendent corollary’ to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the further principle that ‘a 
plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions.’” 
(quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22 
(1983))); Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 (similar); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 
58, 63 (1987) (similar).  The only outlier is Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 
207 (2004), in which the Court characterized the complete preemption cases as de-
lineating “an exception . . . to the well-pleaded complaint rule.” 
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ing under the cause of action provided by federal law.100  In fact, the 
Court has taken the position that a plaintiff who presents a completely 
preempted state-law claim has pleaded artfully—as one court of ap-
peals put it, such a plaintiff has disguised “a federal case in state wrap-
ping paper”101—and thus a federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction over 
such a suit is true to the suit’s essence, if not its appearance.102
The Court’s apparent discomfort with classifying the doctrine as 
an “exception” to the well-pleaded complaint rule is difficult to un-
derstand.  The most significant functional effect of applying the com-
plete preemption rule in any given case is that a federal court (rather 
than a state court) gets to decide whether state law is, in fact, pre-
empted.  But this would be the case whether complete preemption 
doctrine is characterized as a “corollary” to the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule—through which “necessarily federal” claims that have been 
artfully pleaded under state law are recognized as federal—or as an 
“exception” to the well-pleaded complaint rule, under which federal 
jurisdiction is predicated squarely on the fact that a special kind of 
federal defense has been raised.103  To be sure, the latter formulation 
100 See Rivet, 522 U.S. at 476-77 (distinguishing, for jurisdictional purposes, federal 
claim preclusion from complete preemption on the ground that the former, unlike 
the latter, “does not transform the plaintiff’s state-law claims into federal claims” and 
“involv[es] no recasting of the plaintiff’s complaint” (emphasis added)); Taylor, 481 
U.S. at 65 (noting that the “extraordinary pre-emptive power” of certain federal laws 
“converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for 
purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule” (emphasis added)). 
101 Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 790 F.2d 1341, 1344 (7th Cir. 1986). 
102 See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (“[A] claim which 
comes within the scope of [a completely preemptive federal] cause of action, even if 
pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law.” (emphasis added)); Cat-
erpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 (“Once an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, 
any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its incep-
tion, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.” (emphasis added)). 
103 The decision to conceptualize completely preempted cases as intrinsically fed-
eral has two additional practical consequences, though it seems doubtful that either is 
of significance to the Court’s thinking.  First, the Court’s manner of conceptualizing 
these claims would seem to require a federal court to which a completely preempted 
state-law claim has been removed to assess not whether that state-law claim is pre-
empted, but whether the newly fashioned federal-law claim states a claim on which re-
lief can be granted.  Of course, plaintiffs who rely on state law notwithstanding the ex-
istence of a powerfully preemptive federal law may choose to do so because state and 
federal law differ in some material way, and the facts of the plaintiff’s case make state 
law more appealing.  While complete preemption doctrine permits federal courts to 
transform such state-law claims into federal ones, it does not allow them to modify the 
factual allegations or precise legal theories advanced by the plaintiff.  Hence, assuming 
that the plaintiff has selected state law because federal law offers no relief on the facts 
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would require the Court to explain why, in derogation of the well-
pleaded complaint rule, it was authorizing an assertion of federal ju-
risdiction on the basis of a federal defense; but this is no more of a 
burden than explaining why, in derogation of the “master of the 
complaint” rule,104 the courts are authorized to transform a claim ex-
plicitly pleaded in state-law terms into one that sounds in federal law. 
That said, if we take as our premise that the Court is skittish about 
the idea of crafting a true “exception” to the well-pleaded complaint 
rule, then we can begin to understand its decision to frame complete 
preemption doctrine around whether Congress has not only pre-
empted state-law causes of action, but also provided a replacement 
cause of action under federal law.  Where no federal cause of action 
exists, it is considerably more difficult to sustain the fiction that a pre-
empted state-law claim, from its inception, arises under federal law.  
This is true because, without the cause of action, the only federal law 
under which the claim could conceivably arise is the law that gives rise 
to the defense.  Such a result is obviously intolerable to a Court unwill-
ing to countenance the establishment of an “exception” to the well-
pleaded complaint rule. 
III.  COMPLETE PREEMPTION RECONSIDERED 
Some have argued that the doctrine of complete preemption 
ought to be abandoned.  Most prominently, in a dissenting opinion in 
presented, then, immediately after removal, one would expect the defendant to move 
to dismiss on the grounds that the facts alleged by the plaintiff cannot support relief.   
 If, on the other hand, the underlying facts support a viable claim under federal 
law, then the Court’s approach—in contrast to one that simply treated the defense as a 
predicate for removal—would allow the plaintiff’s claim to survive.  If the plaintiff’s 
claim is not “transformed” into a federal one, it must be dismissed on preemption 
grounds (given that federal law provides the exclusive cause of action for the harm al-
leged).  But it is hard to see why the federal courts should have any interest in trans-
forming nonviable state-law claims into viable federal ones for its own sake.  Certainly 
the Court has not justified the doctrine on this basis.  Second, if a plaintiff’s claim is, as 
the Court puts it, “from its inception,” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393, “necessarily federal 
in character,” Taylor, 481 U.S. at 63-64, then it may be incumbent upon a state court 
faced with such a claim to treat it as such whether or not the defendant seeks to re-
move.  That is, in theory, even if a defendant does not seek to remove a completely 
preempted state-law claim, the state court should still treat the plaintiff’s complaint as 
if it asserted the relevant federal cause of action and should assess whether the plaintiff 
has stated a claim under federal law, rather than dismissing the preempted state-law 
cause of action on preemption grounds. 
104 See supra note 98. 
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Beneficial National Bank, Justice Scalia105 took the position that the doc-
trine is both conceptually bankrupt106 and violative of the separation 
of powers.107  The decision of the Eleventh Circuit in Anderson v. H&R 
105 Out of respect for the doctrine of stare decisis, Justice Scalia did not advocate 
the full-scale abandonment of the complete preemption rule.  But he did argue that it 
should not be extended beyond the provisions at issue in Avco and Taylor and statutes 
modeled after them.  Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. at 21-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
106 Justice Scalia explained that “even if the Court is correct that the National 
Bank Act obliterates entirely any state-created right to relief for usury against a na-
tional bank, that does not explain how or why the claim of such a right is transmogri-
fied into the claim of a federal right.”  Id. at 18-19.  Justice Scalia dismissed the Court’s 
oft-repeated claim that completely preempted state-law claims “necessarily ‘arise[] un-
der’ federal law,” see cases cited supra note 59, as mere ipse dixit.  Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 
539 U.S. at 14-15 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 
1, 24 (1983)).  And he insisted, further, that “[t]he proper response to the presenta-
tion of a nonexistent [state-law] claim to a state court is dismissal, not the ‘federalize-
and-remove’ dance authorized by today’s opinion.”  Id. at 18. 
107 See Beneficial Nat’l Bank., 539 U.S. at 21 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is up to 
Congress, not the federal courts, to decide when . . . [to divest] the state courts of au-
thority to decide the federal matter.  Unless and until we receive instruction from 
Congress that claims pre-empted under the National Bank Act . . . ‘arise under’ federal 
law, we simply lack authority to . . . permit[] removal.”). 
 It is tempting to respond to Justice Scalia’s separation of powers objection by not-
ing that the well-pleaded complaint rule is itself a judicial construction, see supra text 
accompanying notes 7-11, 25-28, and arguing that, as such, there should be no objec-
tion to the Supreme Court’s tinkering with that construct.  But things are not so sim-
ple.  To begin with, the text of the federal question statute surely does not forbid the 
construction embodied in the well-pleaded complaint rule.  It remains possible, there-
fore, to treat the establishment of that rule as an ordinary exercise in statutory inter-
pretation, rather than judicial arrogation of control over the scope of federal question 
jurisdiction.  And, if this is true, questions pertaining to the legitimacy of complete 
preemption cannot be answered simply by characterizing the doctrine as part of a lar-
ger, and largely uncontroversial, project of judicial policing of jurisdictional bounda-
ries. 
 Indeed, if anything, situating complete preemption doctrine within the history of 
legislative-judicial interaction relating to the federal question statute provides a strong 
foundation for a claim of congressional acquiescence to the well-pleaded complaint 
rule.  Congress has had ample opportunity since the establishment of the well-pleaded 
complaint rule to direct its abandonment, and it has done nothing of the sort.  More-
over, Congress undertook a significant revision of the Judicial Code in 1948 and, al-
though it was doubtlessly well aware of the well-pleaded complaint rule, it did nothing 
to dislodge it.  Accordingly, even if one were inclined to treat the adoption of the well-
pleaded complaint rule as a case of judicial overreaching, there exists a strong argu-
ment that, as a result of decades of legislative acquiescence, the rule should be treated, 
in effect, as if it were a creature of statute, rather than one of judicial construction.  Cf., 
e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 (1983) (“Congress’ awareness 
of the denial of tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory schools when enacting 
other and related legislation make out an unusually strong case of legislative acquies-
cence in and ratification by implication of the 1970 and 1971 rulings.”); Flood v. 
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283-84 (1972) (treating Congress’s failure, over fifty years, to re-
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Block, Inc.108 (which was overturned by the Supreme Court in Beneficial 
National Bank), effectively takes this position as well (though that 
Court did not deploy separation of powers rhetoric with the same 
vigor as Justice Scalia).109
These concerns are well taken.  The Beneficial National Bank ma-
jority made no effort to engage Justice Scalia’s objection and, indeed, 
the Court has never even attempted to justify its development of this 
unusual jurisdictional rule without explicit (or even implicit)110 con-
gressional authorization.  But the Supreme Court shows no signs of 
abandoning complete preemption doctrine and leaving the task of 
crafting exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule to Congress 
alone.  During the last four years, the Court has twice authorized the 
removal of state-law claims to federal court on the ground that the 
claims are completely preempted by federal law.  Accordingly, for 
those who (like the majority of Justices on the Supreme Court) would 
allow the judiciary more latitude in crafting exceptions to the well-
pleaded complaint rule, the question remains:  what might a sensible 
jurisprudence of preemption-based removal look like? 
ject or adjust the Supreme Court’s prior interpretation of antitrust law’s application to 
major league baseball as ratifying that interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overrid-
ing Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 400-01 (1991) (de-
fending the Court’s occasional reliance on this sort of legislative acquiescence argu-
ment).  But see, e.g., FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 30, at 36-37 (noting that 
“[c]ongressional preoccupation with judicial organization is extremely tenuous all 
through our history except after needs have gone unremedied for so long a time as to 
gather compelling momentum for action, or when some unusually dramatic litigation 
arouses widespread general interest”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in 
Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422, 427-29 (1988) (offering reasons why con-
gressional inaction should not be interpreted as legislative acquiescence to a judicial 
decision).  This serves to highlight, rather than resolve, the questions of legitimacy 
raised by Justice Scalia. 
108 287 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir. 2002). 
109 The Eleventh Circuit held that the complete preemption rule should kick in 
only where Congress specifically “intended to grant a defendant the ability to remove 
the adjudication of the cause of action to a federal court.”  Id. at 1043 (quoting BLAB 
T.V. of Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, Inc., 182 F.3d 851, 857 (11th Cir. 
1999) (emphasis omitted)); see also id. at 1046 (“[W]e also must reject the line of cases 
which have found complete preemption without inquiring into Congress’s intent.”).  
By focusing its inquiry on congressional intent to allow removal, and not on intent to 
render a federal cause of action exclusive (or some other indication that an expansive 
approach toward federal jurisdiction might be in order), the Eleventh Circuit placed 
control of the scope of the complete preemption rule squarely in Congress’s hands. 
110 But see supra note 85 (discussing the legislative history of ERISA). 
  
572 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 537 
 
A.  Preemption, Uniformity, and Federal Jurisdiction 
The first step in crafting a viable doctrine of federal defense re-
moval is (perhaps counterintuitively) to set aside one of our founda-
tional jurisdictional concerns—state court bias against federal 
claims—and to focus intently on the interest in uniformity.  This is 
necessary not because it is a bad idea to take an expansive view of fed-
eral jurisdiction even when there is legitimate reason to fear bias 
among the state courts; to the contrary, this is a perfectly good reason 
to make a federal forum available for the adjudication of federal 
claims.  But concerns relating to state court bias are historically con-
tingent, and a jurisdictional rule crafted around such contingencies 
would necessarily be ad hoc.  It is easy enough to say that the federal 
courts ought to be available when there is special reason to believe 
that state courts cannot be trusted to offer an evenhanded interpreta-
tion of federal law.  But during any given period, state courts might be 
particularly hostile to civil rights claims, the claims of criminal defen-
dants, claims against labor unions, and so on.111  And without knowing 
what sorts of cases will fit into this category as time goes on, it is diffi-
cult to craft a jurisdictional rule that will accommodate this concern 
over the long term.112
The interest in uniformity, however, is of a different character.  
This is true because one can generalize about the sorts of federal 
statutory schemes in connection with which this interest is likely to 
feature prominently.  In particular, there is a close relationship be-
tween the manner in which Congress chooses to deploy its power to 
preempt state law and the intensity of its interest in assuring that fed-
eral law is interpreted and applied uniformly.  By definition, federal 
111 One could argue that state courts are likely to exhibit bias against claims of 
federal preemption and that this tendency is unlikely to change over time, since it is 
rooted in an aversion to the trumping of state authority by the federal government that 
would appear not to be unique to any particular time period or regulatory context.  
Even assuming this is correct, it still affords no basis for selecting a subset of preemp-
tion cases for special jurisdictional treatment, and it is therefore a nonstarter for pur-
poses of crafting a scheme of preemption-based removal unless one is willing to con-
template removal of any case in which state and federal law clash. 
112 This is not to say that concerns of this sort ought never to motivate the estab-
lishment of special rules of jurisdiction.  But judgments of this sort might be especially 
difficult for the judiciary, as opposed to the legislature, to make competently.  Indeed, 
one wonders whether the Avco Court’s failure to invoke the bias concern as a justifica-
tion for its decision—though the decision seems obviously motivated by it—reflects the 
Justices’ recognition of the fact that a judgment premised on this concern and lacking 
clear support in the statute under review pushes the limits of the Court’s authority. 
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preemption of state law produces some measure of uniformity in the 
governing legal rule by crowding out state law that fails to conform to 
the relevant federal guidelines.113  But the relationship between fed-
eral preemption and the interest in uniformity varies from statute to 
statute, and the Court might place complete preemption doctrine on 
more stable ground by offering sustained attention to the nuances of 
this relationship. 
1.  Regulatory Uniformity and Federal Preemption 
To see how the interest in uniformity varies across federal statutes, 
it is helpful to distinguish between two species of this interest.  There 
is, first, what I call “equal-application uniformity.”  This interest is 
rooted in the notion that national law is meant to be, well, national—
which is to say that it would be unfair for residents of State A to be 
subject to rights and obligations different from those applicable to 
residents of State B under a law that is meant to apply equally to all.  
Put otherwise, the meaning and application of federal law ought not 
to turn on the judicial district in which a case is brought.  Crucially, 
this type of uniformity does not vary from statute to statute; national 
law, whatever its content, calls for equal-application uniformity. 
Some statutory schemes, however, are infused with an additional 
interest in what might be called “regulatory uniformity.”  This is an in-
terest in subjecting regulated entities to a single set of legal standards, 
so as to avoid the burdens that might accompany compliance with a 
multitude of rules enacted by different sovereigns.  In contrast to 
equal-application uniformity, the importance of regulatory uniformity 
does vary from statute to statute.  Not all legal rules depend for their 
coherence and achievement of their desired goals on uniformity of 
application.114  And while regulation by the federal government typi-
113 Though the Supreme Court’s cases in this area are radically undertheorized, 
the fact that the Justices are drawn toward preemption cases for special jurisdictional 
treatment suggests at least a tacit understanding of the close relationship between fed-
eral preemption and the interest in uniformity.  See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 
61, at 1365-98 (exploring a variety of Supreme Court decisions governing the breadth 
of preemptive federal statutes and identifying therein a “drive toward federalization” 
animated in large part by the need for uniform national standards). 
114 For example, if courts in some jurisdictions construed Title VII’s prohibition of 
discrimination “because of sex” to cover discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion, while others did not, one might take the position that this is unfair or unwise.  
(Why, you might ask, should federal law protect people in some parts of the country, 
but not others, from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation?)  But this is dif-
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cally homogenizes a rule of law nationwide, there are greater and 
lesser degrees of homogeneity.  And, it is sometimes the case that the 
interest in homogeneity is itself a motivating factor underlying the de-
cision to regulate, while sometimes it is not. 
The presence of a special interest in regulatory uniformity, as op-
posed to run-of-the-mill equal-application uniformity, is often infer-
able from the manner in which Congress deploys its power to preempt 
state law.  Specifically, the more broadly preemptive federal law is, the 
more likely it is that the interest in regulatory uniformity is in play.  
And it would therefore make sense to tether a rule of federal defense 
removal to the scope of federal preemption—that is, to the extent to 
which federal law prohibits state intervention in a given field.  Such a 
rule would channel into the courts thought most likely to provide a 
uniform interpretation of federal law those cases in which the need 
for such an interpretation is most pressing.115
2.  Federal Preemption and Federal Jurisdiction 
Measuring the breadth of federal preemption is not hard science.  
So, while a jurisdictional rule of the sort contemplated here would of-
fer the benefit of drawing on the core policies underlying the estab-
lishment of federal question jurisdiction, it would create uncertainty 
as to when, exactly, a federal regulatory regime is so robustly preemp-
tive as to establish a foundation for defense-based removal.  But the 
inquiry need not be entirely rudderless; a good place to start is with 
the concept of field preemption, because when Congress goes so far 
ferent from believing that such variation in federal employment discrimination law is 
somehow structurally unworkable. 
115 There is a difference in the way we use the word “uniformity” when we talk 
about the unique benefits that federal courts are presumed to provide, as opposed to 
the interest in subjecting regulated entities to a single legal standard.  This is evident 
from the fact that the federal courts could provide uniformity of decision, but not uni-
formity of regulation, by unanimously deciding that a given federal statute does not pre-
empt state law.  But this distinction need not detain us.  The notion that federal courts 
offer a significant benefit over state courts due to their capacity to produce uniform 
decisions would be difficult to sustain were it not joined with the notion that these de-
cisions are also more likely to be correct.  And it is widely accepted that federal courts 
are more expert in the interpretation of federal law than state courts.  See ALI STUDY, 
supra note 12, at 165 (“The federal courts have acquired a considerable expertness in 
the interpretation and application of federal law which would be lost if federal ques-
tion cases were given to the state courts.”).  Hence, where Congress deploys its power 
to preempt in order to assure that regulated entities will be subject to a uniform rule, 
the conventional wisdom suggests that the federal courts, due in large part to their ex-
pertise, will be best suited to advancing the uniformity interest. 
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as to oust states entirely from a given field of regulation, there is a 
strong basis upon which to conclude that it wishes to hold regulated 
entities to a single, uniform standard. 
When Congress occupies an entire field, federal law establishes 
both a regulatory floor and ceiling.  All state law—even if it does not 
squarely conflict with federal standards, indeed, even if it is duplica-
tive of federal standards116—is disabled.  In contrast, where federal law 
is preemptive, but does not occupy the entire field, state law is inop-
erative only to the extent that it conflicts with federal law.  Absent 
field preemption, state legislatures are typically permitted to supple-
ment the federal regime by, for example, imposing requirements on 
regulated entities above and beyond what federal law requires.117  The 
divergent effects of field versus partial preemption on the likelihood 
of regulatory uniformity are clear:  when states are permitted to sup-
plement a federal statutory scheme, the likelihood of efficiency-based 
uniformity decreases; when Congress decides, instead, to disable all 
state law within a given field, the likelihood of regulatory uniformity is 
significantly enhanced. 
There is, unsurprisingly, plenty of case law confirming that field-
preemptive federal statutes are specially designed to secure regulatory 
uniformity.  When discussing federal statutes that have been con-
strued to occupy entire fields, the Court has repeatedly emphasized 
Congress’s interest in holding regulated entities to a single standard 
and has focused its attention on the inefficiencies and other harms 
that might plague the field in question absent federal “occupation.”  
Field preemption, the Court has explained, relieves regulated entities 
of the “impossible task” of “follow[ing] closely the laws of the 48 dif-
ferent States, the regulations thereunder, and the administrative rul-
116 See, e.g., S. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Ind., 236 U.S. 439, 448 (1915) (deeming 
an Indiana law imposing penalties on railway companies for failure to equip railcars 
with hand-holds to be preempted by a federal law that imposed penalties for the 
same). 
117 See, e.g., Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987) (“Con-
gress intended the [Pregnancy Discrimination Act] to be ‘a floor beneath which preg-
nancy disability benefits may not drop—not a ceiling above which they may not rise.’” 
(quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir. 1985))). 
 I say “typically” because states might be prohibited from supplementing a federal 
regulatory scheme, if doing so would “frustrate the purpose” of the federal scheme.  
And a court might conclude that this is so without holding that Congress has occupied 
an entire field.  Of course, the more forms of state regulatory intervention are deemed 
to frustrate the purpose of a given federal law, the more reasonable it is to conclude 
that federal law occupies the entire field.  As I explain below, the labels do not really 
matter; the breadth of federal preemption does. 
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ings thereunder.”118  It “establishe[s] a system of uniform fed-
eral . . . standards” and thereby “avoid[s] duplicative, and possibly 
counterproductive, regulation” by the states.119  These cases, and many 
others like them, make clear that when federal law preempts an entire 
field, we can say with confidence that the creation of a uniform regu-
latory standard is not simply the effect of federal regulation, but, 
rather, it is among the causes of Congress’s decision to regulate in the 
first place. 
This is not to say that the interest in regulatory uniformity plays no 
role in preemptive federal statutory schemes that stop short of occupy-
ing an entire field.  One could surely cobble together statements from 
Supreme Court decisions relating to ordinary preemptive statutes 
(i.e., preemptive statutes that do not occupy an entire field) and paint 
a roughly similar picture of the role played by regulatory uniformity in 
connection with these provisions.120  In addition, the line distinguish-
ing field preemption from other forms of federal preemption is noto-
riously blurry,121 so even the label the courts choose to attach to the 
preemptive scope of a federal regulatory scheme is an imperfect indi-
cator of just how aggressive Congress means to be in crowding states 
out of the relevant sphere. 
For these reasons, if complete preemption jurisprudence is to be 
reshaped with an eye to the breadth of federal preemption, the in-
quiry ought not to begin and end with the field preemption construct.  
The hallmark of a preemptive regulatory regime that should suffice to 
underwrite federal defense removal is that supplementary state legisla-
118 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 233 n.11 (1947) (quoting S. REP. 
NO. 71-1775, at 2); see also id. at 236 (noting that “by eliminating dual regulation and 
substituting regulation by one agency, Congress sought to achieve ‘fair and uniform 
business practices’ which . . . was the purpose of the amended Act” (quoting Fed. 
Compress & Warehouse Co. v. McLean, 291 U.S. 17, 23 (1934))). 
119 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 102 (1992).  While the 
Court couched its holding in this case as one of implied conflict preemption, it noted 
that the label “field preemption” was equally appropriate.  Id. at 104 n.2. 
120
Indeed, one way of distinguishing partial from field preemption is to say that 
the latter seeks to establish a uniform rule across a narrower sphere.  
121 See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-28, at 1176-77 
(3d ed. 2000) (noting that the categories of preemption are “anything but analytically 
air-tight” and, in particular, that field preemption “may fall into any of . . . three cate-
gories”—namely, express, implied, or conflict preemption).  The porosity of these 
categories has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court.  See, e.g., English v. Gen. 
Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990) (noting that the preemption categories are not 
“rigidly distinct” and explaining that “field pre-emption may be understood as a spe-
cies of conflict pre-emption”). 
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tion is prohibited; the label attached to such a preemptive scheme is 
ultimately insignificant.  If federal law is construed to prevent states 
from heaping on regulated entities obligations above and beyond 
those animated by federal law, then it is reasonable to conclude that 
Congress has endeavored to assure not just equal-application uniform-
ity, but regulatory uniformity as well.  Hammering out precisely which 
federal statutes will fall within the ambit of this rule (other than field 
preemptive statutes) will be no easy task; but the development over 
time of the necessary rules of federal defense removal, crafted in light 
of the values that are central to our scheme of federal jurisdiction, is 
preferable to continuing along the path the Court is currently on.122
B.  The Mechanics of Federal Defense Removal 
This sort of shift in the jurisprudence of complete preemption 
would require some reshaping of the basic structure of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction.  Some of this is already part of existing doctrine as a 
functional (if not formal) matter.  Specifically, the Court would have 
to abandon the pretense that removal on the basis of a defense is pro-
hibited.  Of course, if we value judicial candor over unflinching for-
mal adherence to established rules, this is to be celebrated, rather 
than lamented. 
In addition, this approach toward complete preemption would 
require rethinking the question of which parties are permitted to re-
move cases to federal court.  The removal statute currently permits 
defendants to remove to federal court, but not plaintiffs.123  Where the 
existence of federal question jurisdiction turns exclusively on the con-
tent of the plaintiff’s pleading, this approach is defensible; it estab-
lishes a kind of symmetry with respect to the parties’ access to the fed-
eral courts.  In a case that is eligible for both state and federal 
jurisdiction, the plaintiff makes the initial decision whether to file in 
state or federal court.  If the plaintiff opts for the former, the defen-
dant then chooses whether to remain in the state system or, instead, 
122 And, of course, the current regime hardly relieves the courts of the obligation 
to decide difficult questions pertaining to the applicability of the complete preemp-
tion rule.  For example, existing doctrine requires courts to determine whether Con-
gress intended a particular cause of action to be exclusive and whether the cause of 
action presented by the plaintiff falls within the ambit of the federal right of action.  
Compare Brief of Petitioners at 11-15, Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 
(2003) (No. 02-306), with Brief of Respondents at 15 n.12, Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. 
Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003) (No. 02-306). 
123 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000). 
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remove to federal court.  Each party is able to invoke the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts so long as the well-pleaded complaint rule is sat-
isfied. 
If, however, it becomes possible for federal question jurisdiction 
to be rooted in the content of the defendant’s pleading, the plaintiff 
must enjoy a right to remove in order to preserve this symmetry.124  
There is no sound reason to permit defendants to remove to federal 
court because they have claimed rights under a broadly preemptive 
federal statute while forbidding plaintiffs from doing the same.125
CONCLUSION 
The puzzle of complete preemption lies in the Court’s failure to 
connect the doctrine to basic policies that have been understood since 
the Founding to support the establishment of federal question juris-
diction.  Since the initial decision in Avco, which failed even to ac-
knowledge the oddity of the Court’s jurisdictional maneuver, much 
less attempt to justify it, the doctrine has evolved in a common-law-like 
fashion.  And not once along the way has the Court made an effort to 
explicate the doctrine by reference to the foundational principles un-
derlying our jurisdictional structure. 
It is little wonder, then, that Justice Scalia recently called for the 
virtual abandonment of the complete preemption rule.  To be sure, 
the core of his gripe lies in separation of powers concerns that would 
not be resolved even if the doctrine were reoriented so as to reflect 
sound jurisdictional policy.  But the doctrinal disarray and conceptual 
impoverishment that currently characterize complete preemption 
make it an easy target. 
I have suggested that the jurisprudence of complete preemption 
might stand on firmer ground if the availability of federal defense 
removal turned on the breadth of the preemptive statute relied upon 
by the defendant.  Where federal law is broadly preemptive of state 
124 Removal by plaintiffs is hardly an unfamiliar concept.  Under the Judiciary Act 
of 1875, both parties were permitted to remove.  Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 
Stat. 470, 470-71.  The notion of plaintiff removal has attracted support from leading 
authorities on the subject of federal jurisdiction.  See, e.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 12, at 
192 (“[D]efendant should be permitted to remove to guard against the danger that 
the state court . . . will give an unduly expansive construction to the plaintiff’s 
claim. . . . By similar reasoning, plaintiff should be allowed to remove if the defendant 
has relied on a federal defense which the state court might read too broadly.”). 
125 ALI STUDY, supra note 12, at 194 (“It is logically sound to permit removal to the 
party who opposes the federal right as well as to the party who asserts the right.”). 
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regulation, there is good reason to believe that one of the core func-
tions of the federal judiciary—preservation of uniformity (in particu-
lar, regulatory uniformity)—is specially implicated; it therefore makes 
good sense to take an expansive view of federal jurisdiction where in-
terpretation of such statutes is called for.  The devil is sure to be in the 
details.  Crafting a body of case law that distinguishes those federal 
statutes that are so robustly preemptive as to merit special jurisdic-
tional treatment from those that are not will present significant line-
drawing challenges.  But at least the details on which the courts’ atten-
tion will be focused under this approach relate to the core values un-
derlying the establishment of federal question jurisdiction and, hence, 
to the mission of the federal courts. 
 
